# Sentencing Submission on Behalf of Nishad Singh, part 6 of 6 (ECF pages 54 to 63) [Index](index.html) · [PDF](pdf/ecf-523-singh-sentencing-submission.pdf) · [Whole document](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523.html) · [Web page](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-6.html) · Part 6 of 6. Parts: [1](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-1.html) [2](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-2.html) [3](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-3.html) [4](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-4.html) [5](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-5.html) 6 · About this text version: at the end of this page **Contents** (added for navigation; not part of the document) - VI. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), AND § 5K1.1. (ECF p. 54) - A. Nature and Circumstances of Offense (ECF p. 54) - B. History and Characteristics of Defendant (ECF p. 57) - C. General and Specific Deterrence (ECF p. 58) - VII. CONCLUSION (ECF p. 62) - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (ECF p. 63) --- [ECF p. 54] ## VI. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), AND § 5K1.1. In determining an appropriate sentence, the Court should consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among others, these include “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” as well as “the need for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense” and “to afford adequate deterrence.” § 3553(a). Upon the Government’s motion, as is the case here, the Court should also consider whether a sentence reduction is appropriate for a cooperating witness who provides “substantial assistance” in an investigation or prosecution based on the non-exhaustive factors set forth in § 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. These “include, but are not limited to,” the following: > (1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered; > (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; > (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; > (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; and > (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. § 5K1.1(a)(1)–(5). Here, we respectfully submit that a sentence of time served for Nishad fulfills the goals of § 3553(a) and § 5K1.1. ### A. Nature and Circumstances of Offense These were undeniably serious offenses. At their core, they involved the theft of billions of dollars of hard-earned assets from FTX customers and a web of deception to further the scheme. But in weighing this factor the Court must take into account the defendant’s specific role in the offense and his relative culpability. As the trial testimony showed, and as we believe the Government does not dispute, Nishad’s role in the core customer fraud was limited in duration and scope, particularly in comparison to his co-defendants. Indeed, the Probation Department – in [ECF p. 55] recognition of Nishad’s limited role in the core customer fraud charge – has recommended an extremely significant variance from the Guidelines *without* accounting for Nishad’s extensive cooperation. Nishad learned about the customer fraud scheme, which had been ongoing for years, just two months before FTX collapsed and declared bankruptcy. For the vast majority of his time at Alameda and FTX, Nishad did not knowingly further the conspiracy to steal customer assets. And when Nishad did learn about what happened, he was appalled. As the Government stated in describing Nishad’s role and actions: > And let’s talk about Nishad. The defense made a big deal out of the fact that he learned of the conspiracy and joined it a little later. I expect Judge Kaplan is going to instruct you that different people can play different roles in a conspiracy. You can play a minor role, you can play a major role, you can join at a different time. You’re still part of the conspiracy. And so it’s no surprise that Nishad, who didn’t work at Alameda, didn’t have visibility into all the spending and all the use of customer money, but when he did, when it sunk in, he didn’t say, oh, nothing wrong going on here. He confronted the defendant on that balcony. He was shocked, he was blindsided, and eventually he was suicidal. That is not somebody who didn’t think he was doing anything wrong. Trial Tr. at 3126:11–24. In other words, Nishad became a participant in the wrongdoing at a very late stage, and even as he did, he was incredibly distressed with what was happening. Of course, though his role pales in comparison to his co-conspirators, Nishad still engaged in conduct that was illegal. After learning about the customer fraud scheme, he continued to approve expenditures, including campaign donations, that he understood effectively must have been coming from customer funds. We do not suggest, by any means, that Nishad’s conduct here was appropriate. But his misconduct in the customer fraud scheme is substantially fractional to the other participants, and his motive to stay once he learned of the scheme is relevant: he took steps to mitigate the damage the existing fraud would cause. As described above, Nishad tried to convince Bankman-Fried to make substantial spending cuts with varying levels of success, including cutting back endorsement deals, [ECF p. 56] unwinding company acquisitions, and leading the effort to cancel a new multi-hundred-million-dollar FTX office space; he successfully safeguarded segments of user funds from Bankman-Fried; and he refused to build certain features that would have encouraged customers, old and new, to deposit even more money. By contrast, Bankman-Fried orchestrated the core customer fraud scheme and engaged in conduct for years that furthered this crime. Wang and Ellison were also knowing participants for years. They were critical to carrying out Bankman-Fried’s scheme in a manner that Nishad, who worked under Wang’s supervision, was not – precisely why Nishad was kept in the dark about the scheme for years and only found out about it when the problems grew too large to fix. And Nishad, unlike Ellison, did not deceive Alameda’s lenders, and did not play a role the decision to use billions of dollars in FTX customer money to pay those lenders. Nishad also pleaded guilty to campaign finance violations. His culpability stems from allowing individuals at FTX, including Bankman-Fried, to use his name to make political donations – and consciously avoiding learning about the relevant law when he began to see red flags. The broader offense is serious, but it is relevant that this scheme was not intended to personally benefit Nishad at all. It furthered Bankman-Fried’s interests first and foremost, and FTX’s secondarily (although, because Bankman-Fried was the face of FTX, this too furthered his interests). Nor did Nishad benefit from it in practice. He never spoke to, let alone met with, any politicians or government officials who received the donations for which he was used as a straw (nor was he interested in doing so), and did not engage in any other conduct suggesting that he was using the political donations to bolster his standing within certain political communities – making him unlike both Bankman-Fried and Salame. Although Nishad should have removed himself once he learned that many of the later donations were being funded by Alameda – and were more crassly for the benefit of FTX and Bankman-Fried – Nishad continued to sign off on donations made under his name out of a misguided sense of loyalty, despite growing increasingly tormented. In this sense, Nishad was a true “straw” donor, and significantly less culpable than others involved in the scheme. [ECF p. 57] Finally, it bears repeating that the full scope of the campaign finance scheme likely would not have been revealed absent Nishad’s cooperation and preservation of relevant materials to the Government. The campaign finance charges against Bankman-Fried and Salame were predicated substantially on Nishad’s cooperation. We note all of this to make clear that when the Court fashions a sentence that takes into consideration Nishad’s significant cooperation, that sentence – as the Probation Department appears to have recognized in crafting its own recommendation – should *start* from a pre-cooperation baseline that considers Nishad’s significantly lesser culpability relative to the others involved. ### B. History and Characteristics of Defendant As Nishad’s sentencing letters demonstrate, notwithstanding the flaws that caused him to engage in the charged conduct, he is a uniquely special person. He recently turned 29 years old, and yet by any measure has already lived a life of immense good works that have had lasting impacts on many, many people. At his core, Nishad is a compassionate and empathetic young man who takes great care in the way he treats others. The many stories demonstrating this are not limited to certain periods in his life, nor do they materially vary based on the author of his sentencing letters. Rather, individuals from all walks of life – whether a close family member or friend, a fellow software engineer, a housecleaner, or a homeless shelter volunteer – write that Nishad is one of the most genuinely caring individuals they have ever met, and each one points to specific examples where Nishad demonstrated his selflessness and compassion. Unsurprisingly, Nishad had been a role model to many of his peers – and still is to this day, despite his serious criminal conviction. Even knowing his conduct and the harm it has directly caused them, coworkers from his time at FTX “truly hope to one day have the opportunity to work with him again.” Ex. A at 7 (A. Yedidia); *see, e.g.*, Ex. A at 11 (R. Suero). Indeed, eighteen former employees have written letters in support of Nishad, including every employee that served as a witness at trial that was not himself or herself a defendant. Ex. A at 6–33. Though the Court has surely sentenced defendants whose offense conduct is otherwise anomalous to their character, that [ECF p. 58] anomaly is particularly stark here. It is thus not surprising that for the vast majority of his time at FTX, Nishad was a uniquely *positive* force there. Nishad was a beloved manager and co-worker. More significantly, no other individual, let alone one of the other defendants, took it upon themselves the way Nishad did to address issues within FTX as they arose. As his relationship with Bankman-Fried evolved from “admiration and respect” to eventual “distrust,” Nishad’s approach evolved, too. Trial Tr. at 1308:17–19. Early on, he shared his views on moral or personnel issues with Bankman-Fried, offering advice lightly and at times anonymously, as Bankman-Fried told this Court during his own sentencing hearing.[^20] Over time, Nishad became more vocal, serving as the voice against “excessive” and “flashy” expenditures, and ultimately confronting Bankman-Fried in face-to-face conversations in ways that others simply did not have the courage to do. Nishad took these actions because he fundamentally *did not* have a broken moral compass. [^20]: Bankman-Fried stated: > I remember back earlier on, 2018, Alameda was in danger of falling apart. I got a message one day. Explained what I needed to do to fix things in a way that I hadn't been able to see myself. There was an anonymous message, but it had sort of a combination of empathy and logic in it that made it clear it had to be from Nishad. He was famously humble and that often hid how brilliant he was as well. Bankman-Fried Sentencing Tr. at 34:6–12. Indeed, after learning about the scheme and becoming complicit, Nishad immediately understood and appreciated its severity. In particular, after his conversation with Bankman-Fried on the Orchid balcony, Nishad’s first thoughts were about how “evil” the scheme was because he understood “that customers were betrayed,” many of whom “put their trust in” Nishad and the larger FTX enterprise. Trial Tr. at 1409:6–11. While he faltered and fell significantly at points during his time at FTX, Nishad is someone with a true moral compass. He cares about others more than himself; he knows right from wrong; and he will forever regret his involvement in wrongdoing at FTX. ### C. General and Specific Deterrence There is no dispute that general deterrence is an important consideration. The Court has [ECF p. 59] referred to it in prior sentences in this case, and it has been reflected in those sentences, including significant terms of imprisonment imposed on Bankman-Fried (25 years) and Salame (7 years). And in sentencing Ellison, a cooperator, the Court declined her request for time served, noting the need to send a deterrent message – and specifically to avoid the message that cooperation is a “get out of jail free card” given the seriousness of her conduct. *See* Ellison Sentencing Tr. at 32:19–21. We respect the Court’s reasoning in that instance. But this need not be – and of course, is not – a message that must be sent every time a cooperator comes before the Court. And it need not apply across the board to every cooperator in a given case, however significant. Courts have a responsibility to distinguish between defendants based on their underlying conduct and personal circumstances and characteristics. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). Here, in deciding whether a message of general deterrence must be sent again, the Court should consider Nishad’s level of culpability relative to the others involved. As reflected throughout this submission and what we expect will be in the Government’s submission, Nishad is situated differently. He came to understand what was happening very late in the game, and for the vast majority of the scheme did nothing to further it. With respect to campaign finance, his role was that of a straw. The Probation Office recognized the disparity between Nishad’s culpability and that of the others by recommending a dramatic variance from the Guidelines for Nishad even before considering his extensive cooperation. A sentence of incarceration here could send the *opposite* kind of deterrent message that the Court intends. In deciding whether to cooperate, individuals with somewhat lower levels of culpability (and defense counsel advising those individuals) often assess the punishment they would receive without cooperating, and that assessment is necessarily informed by precedent in the relevant district. Sentencing someone like Nishad to a term of imprisonment – especially one approaching the term accorded to Ellison – would send precisely the wrong message to individuals on the lower end of the culpability spectrum in future Southern District investigations who are [ECF p. 60] evaluating whether to cooperate. It could deter such individuals from coming forward. In other words, it is not simply that cooperator sentences should be lenient because “[s]uccessful prosecutions frequently depend upon the credibility of cooperating witnesses in the eyes of the jury.” *United States v. Doe*, 348 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2003); *cf. United States v. Singh*, No. 13-cr-570, 2014 WL 4773982, at \*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2014) (explaining noncustodial sentences for government cooperators “provid[es] an incentive for criminal defendants to cooperate with the government in the future”). It is that successful prosecutions depend on both the “partner in crime” coming forward *and* the individual with lesser culpability coming forward. Evaluating the right message to send in sentencing a cooperator should not be a one-size-fits-all approach, because potential cooperators on different ends of the culpability spectrum face vastly different decisions. For these reasons, courts in the Southern District have typically imposed noncustodial sentences for cooperators who are similarly situated to Nishad, and even for those whose involvement in the offense was greater than Nishad’s. *See, e.g.*: - *United States v. Seth Horowitz*, Case No. 19-cr-861 (Ramos, J.): Sentence of time served for a cooperating defendant, the chief operating officer of a public company, who pled guilty to securities fraud and other offenses related to a scheme to inflate the company’s publicly reported revenue and earnings per share. - *United States v. Eric Rohr*, Case No. 19-cr-595 (Abrams, J.): Sentence of time served for a cooperating defendant, the chief financial officer of a large private company, who pled guilty to securities and wire fraud offenses related to a scheme to obtain millions of dollars in secured loans for the company by grossly inflating the prices of bonds used as collateral. - *United States v. Amin Majidi*, Case No. 18-cr-328 (Polk Failla, J.): Sentence of time served for a cooperating defendant, a portfolio manager for a hedge fund, who pled guilty to securities fraud offenses related to a scheme to inflate the “net asset value” of the fund, and who lied to the Government during his cooperation about a potential violation of U.S. sanctions law. - *United States v. Jordan Fogel*, Case No. 17-cr-308 (Kaplan, J.): Sentence of time served for a cooperating defendant who pled guilty to securities fraud offenses related to his involvement in an insider trading scheme at his former company; in addition to his offenses, the defendant lied to the Government about his drug relapse during his cooperation. [ECF p. 61] - *United States v. Daniel Tzvetkoff*, Case No. 10-cr-336 (Kaplan, J.): Sentence of time served for a cooperating defendant who pled guilty to money laundering and bank fraud offenses in connection with processing more than $500 million in internet gambling proceeds. With respect to specific deterrence, Nishad is an extremely unlikely recidivist. As noted above, he had a strong moral compass throughout his time at FTX. He knew right from wrong, particularly when it came to the theft of customer assets, which his trial testimony demonstrates. The gravity of what had happened sunk in immediately for Nishad – before he had ever been contacted by prosecutors, let alone faced the reality of pleading guilty here. Grappling with his own suicidality and guilt in the aftermath of FTX’s collapse has sufficiently deterred him from ever engaging in remotely similar behavior. What is more, Nishad has substantially turned his life around in the two years since the collapse of FTX. In addition to his extensive cooperation, Nishad has started to live a busy, fulfilling, and productive life, supported by a network of family and friends. Returning home after living abroad for several years has grounded Nishad and, in some ways, it has been a full circle moment for him. As one example out of many, he recently ran his first ultramarathon since high school last month (after failing to take care of his health while working at Alameda and FTX). PSR ¶ 82. He is working in a far more stable and “routine” job while making use of his engineering skills, and his employer writes that Nishad has quickly become a valuable asset to the company. *Id.* ¶ 92. Nishad also became recently engaged to his long-time girlfriend Ms. Watanabe, who he lives with, and the two will consider a wedding date after Nishad’s sentencing. PSR ¶ 82. He is also engaging in other soul-fulfilling activities, such as volunteering at a day-time shelter for the unhoused (a topic that has touched Nishad personally ever since his first field trip to San Francisco at eight years old), rekindling old friendships, and playing with his two dogs in the local park nearby. *Id.* Finally, to his credit, Nishad has regularly sought treatment from a psychiatrist for his mental health, which has steadily improved since mid-2023. *Id.* ¶¶ 86–87. With the obvious exception of his sentencing in this case, Nishad has much to look forward to, both in the near and [ECF p. 62] long terms, and is slowly becoming the happy young man he once was. ## VII. CONCLUSION Dated: New York, New York October 16, 2024 Respectfully submitted, COOLEY LLP By: */s/Andrew Goldstein* Andrew D. Goldstein Russell Capone Anupam Dhillon (*not admitted PHV*) 55 Hudson Yards New York, NY 10001-2157 Tel. (212) 479-6000 Email: agoldstein@cooley.com rcapone@cooley.com adhillon@cooley.com *Attorneys for Defendant Nishad Singh* [ECF p. 63] ## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that, on October 16, 2024, the foregoing document and its exhibits were served electronically to all parties of record by CM/ECF system. */s/ Andrew D. Goldstein* Andrew D. Goldstein --- **About this text version** This is a text version of the sentencing memorandum that Nishad Singh’s lawyers, Cooley LLP, filed on October 16, 2024 in *United States v. Nishad Singh*, No. 22-cr-673 (LAK), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. It is docket entry 523 (“ECF No. 523”) and runs 63 pages. The public filing is redacted in places. **Note by this site, not part of the document:** Its sections are a preliminary statement (pages 2 to 4), Singh’s personal history (pages 5 to 24), his role in the offense conduct (pages 25 to 45), his remorse and cooperation (pages 46 to 50), his life since FTX’s collapse (pages 51 to 53), and the sentencing guidelines and statutory factors (pages 54 to 62). - This is part 6 of 6 of the text version, covering ECF pages 54 to 63. The document is divided so that software which reads only the beginning of a long page can still read all of it. Other parts: [part 1](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-1.html), [part 2](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-2.html), [part 3](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-3.html), [part 4](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-4.html), [part 5](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-5.html). The whole document on one page: [singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523.html](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523.html). The PDF this text was made from is [here](pdf/ecf-523-singh-sentencing-submission.pdf), and the same filing is on [CourtListener](https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.594742/gov.uscourts.nysd.594742.523.0.pdf). This part as plain text: [singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-6.txt](singh-sentencing-submission-ecf-523-part-6.txt). The other documents from the case: [index](index.html). - It was converted by software from the PDF filed on the court’s docket. Every page that holds text was then compared by machine with a separate extraction of the same PDF. Page 50, which is an image of the page, was typed out and read against the image. If this text and the PDF ever differ, the PDF controls. - `[ECF p. 14]` marks the start of page 14 of the PDF, counted by the page numbers the court stamps at the top of each page (“Page 14 of 63”). A citation such as “ECF No. 523 at 14” uses those numbers. The memorandum’s own page numbers, printed at the foot of its pages, are one lower. - Footnotes appear directly after the paragraph that cites them, not at the foot of the page. In the PDF each footnote is printed on the page that carries its number in the text, so a footnote is cited by that page. Footnote 2 runs on to a second page, and the marker `[footnote 2 continues on ECF p. 15]` shows where. - `[REDACTED]` marks a passage blacked out in the public filing. The redactions are those of the filing itself. - Page 50 of the PDF is an image of the page. Its text was typed out from the image, and a note at that place in the text says what was done. - Italic and bold type are shown with asterisks, and block quotations and other set-off passages with `>`. One asterisk belongs to the original (`at *2`, on page 60); in the plain-text version it is written `\*` so that it is not read as emphasis. Line breaks inside paragraphs and the spacing of the original are not reproduced, and neither are the court’s stamp at the top of each page and the memorandum’s own page numbers at the foot. Ruled lines and underlining are not reproduced either: the caption on page 1 and the signature block on page 62 are set in ruled boxes, a short rule stands above the footnotes on each page that has them, and the title on page 1, the heading “CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE” on page 63 and the signatures on pages 62 and 63 are underlined. The caption on page 1 and the signature block on page 62 are set in two columns, and each is given here one column after the other. Errors in the original are left as they are. - The memorandum cites exhibits that are separate documents. Text versions of two of them are on this site: [Exhibit A](exhibit-a-letters-to-the-court-ecf-523-1.html) (letters to the Court, ECF No. 523-1) and [Exhibit B](exhibit-b-singh-letter-to-the-court-ecf-523-2.html) (Singh’s letter to the Court, ECF No. 523-2). Exhibits C and D (two documents written by Samuel Bankman-Fried, ECF Nos. 523-3 and 523-4) are not reproduced on this site. The New York Times hosts [a PDF of the sentencing submission together with its exhibits](https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/02780b6d3f9a0f08/dd12bbcd-full.pdf), and the court’s docket is available through PACER. A citation such as “Ex. A at 45” gives the page of the exhibit as the court stamps it.