Government’s Sentencing Letter Regarding Nishad Singh, part 1 of 2 (ECF pages 1 to 9)

[ECF p. 1]

U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Southern District of New York
The Jacob K. Javits Federal Building
26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor
New York, New York 10278

October 23, 2024

BY ECF

Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan
United States District Judge
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, NY 10007-1312

Re: United States v. Nishad Singh, 22 Cr. 673 (LAK)

Dear Judge Kaplan:

The Government writes in advance of defendant Nishad Singh’s sentencing scheduled for October 23, 2024, at 3:00 p.m., to advise the Court of his exemplary cooperation that was important to the Government’s successful prosecutions of Samuel Bankman-Fried and Ryan Salame, and the recovery of assets stolen during one of the largest financial frauds in history. This submission describes Singh’s substantial assistance in the investigation of wrongdoing at FTX, the prosecution and trial of Bankman-Fried, and the prosecution of Salame.

As detailed below, Singh’s testimony was a core part of the Government’s proof at the trial against Bankman-Fried. In particular, Singh provided important testimony about Bankman-Fried’s mental state in September through November 2022, recounting for the jury in vivid detail his conversations with Bankman-Fried about the theft and use of FTX customers’ funds. He aided the Government in understanding how FTX’s code permitted the illegal use of customers’ funds, and he identified in detail the transactions by Bankman-Fried that involved the use of stolen money. Singh also brought to the Government’s attention criminal conduct that the Government was not aware of and, in some cases, may have never discovered but for Singh’s cooperation. That included information about Bankman-Fried and Salame engaging in one of the largest-ever campaign finance schemes, and instances when Bankman-Fried manipulated FTX’s financials to make its revenue appear greater. Singh approached his cooperation with earnest remorse and eagerness to assist. He began meeting with the Government shortly after FTX’s collapse, produced Signal messages to the Government that would otherwise have been unavailable, and spent considerable time reviewing documents and FTX’s code to help identify key pieces of evidence that were used at trial.

In light of these facts, and assuming that Singh continues to comply with the terms of his cooperation agreement, commits no additional crimes before sentencing, and appears for his sentencing as scheduled, the Government intends to move at sentencing, pursuant to Section 5K1.1 [ECF p. 2] of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”), that the Court sentence Singh in light of the factors set forth in Section 5K1.1(a) of the Guidelines.

I. Background and Offense Conduct

Singh grew up in the Bay Area and attended high school with Samuel Bankman-Fried’s younger brother. In college, Singh became interested in effective altruism. After college, he was hired by Facebook and committed to donating some of his income to charities. During this period he was reconnected with Bankman-Fried, whom he had met in high school, and who had also expressed an interest in effective altruism. In 2017, Bankman-Fried invited Singh to visit Alameda Research, which Bankman-Fried had founded in northern California. Singh admired Bankman-Fried’s success and was drawn to Alameda Research because its employees had pledged to donate 50% of the firm’s profits to charity. At the time, Singh was an inexperienced software engineer, having just graduated college. He started at Alameda Research on a trial basis, and was later offered a full-time job. While at Alameda, Singh was focused on automating Alameda’s trading. Throughout his time at Alameda Research, Singh never directed the firm’s trading; he did not control the firm’s funds; he was not involved in the firm’s borrowing of money from lenders; and he was not in an executive-level leadership position.

In 2018, Bankman-Fried relocated to Hong Kong to start FTX. By April 2019, Singh was spending most of his time working on the exchange. Singh ultimately relocated to Hong Kong in February 2020. Singh eventually became an engineering manager at FTX and then FTX’s Head of Engineering. At FTX, Singh was focused on FTX coding and tech support alongside Gary Wang. Over time, Singh divided his time between coding and managing other engineers. By the time of FTX’s collapse, Singh had a team of approximately 20 engineers.

A. Fraud on FTX Customers

The evidence at Bankman-Fried’s trial proved that over the course of multiple years, Bankman-Fried stole and directed the misappropriation of billions of dollars in customers’ funds. The fraud is one of the largest financial frauds ever, resulting in billions of dollars in losses and thousands of affected victims. While not the mastermind, Singh, like Bankman-Fried’s other co-conspirators, contributed to the fraud on FTX customers. As Singh described during his guilty plea and at Bankman-Fried’s trial, he came to understand how customer funds had been used by Bankman-Fried long after Singh had assisted in putting in place the computer code that allowed Bankman-Fried to steal the money. Nonetheless, this was an incredibly serious crime, for which Singh has accepted responsibility and expressed remorse.

Singh’s involvement began, unwittingly, early in his time at FTX. Bankman-Fried asked Wang and Singh to implement features in FTX’s code that gave Alameda Research various forms of preferential treatment. Wang and Singh—at Bankman-Fried’s direction—added an “allow negative balance” feature to FTX’s code, which later permitted Alameda Research to have a negative balance on FTX. When Singh implemented the initial version of “allow negative” in July 2019 (when he was still in California and Bankman-Fried was in Hong Kong), he understood the feature was to be used to facilitate the transfer of locked FTT. (Trial Tr. at 1365). In fact, as he would later learn, Bankman-Fried used the “allow negative” feature to withdraw billions of dollars [ECF p. 3] in customer money from the FTX exchange. Wang also later added features—that Singh learned about over time— permitting Alameda Research to withdraw money from the exchange, even if it did not have sufficient funds, and to be exempt from the exchange’s automatic liquidation feature.

Singh also knew that some FTX customer fiat deposits were processed through Alameda Research’s bank accounts, and were tracked in FTX’s database under fiat@ftx.com. (Trial Tr. at 1351). For years he believed that Alameda Research was accounting for these deposits properly. For instance, in late 2021, after an accounting “bug” was discovered, Singh asked Caroline Ellison about whether Alameda Research was still using the fiat@ftx.com account to track deposits, and she confirmed that it was. (Trial Tr. at 1517).

In May 2022, the cryptocurrency stablecoin Terra and its sister token, Luna, collapsed in value, triggering a collapse of several other cryptocurrency businesses such as the firm Three Arrows and the lenders Celsius and Voyager. Unbeknownst to Singh—who was not involved in Alameda Research’s borrowing—the instability in the cryptocurrency market caused Alameda Research’s lenders to recall nearly all of their loans.

In June 2022, Bankman-Fried asked Ellison, Wang, and Singh to work to calculate Alameda Research’s balances on FTX.com. While Singh was not involved in accounting for FTX and Alameda Research, and the request did not “fit into [his] overall responsibilities at FTX,” Singh agreed to help. Singh recalls that he asked Wang what he could do to assist, and Wang asked him to identify any accounts on FTX that belonged to Alameda Research. (Trial Tr. at 1348). Wang re-did Singh’s work, and the resulting spreadsheet showed Alameda Research had incurred a negative $2.7 billion balance in its main account on FTX.com. That fact “seriously concerned” Singh because it “seemed like a real abuse of a feature that until this point [he] believed was serving FTX, not hurting it.” (Trial Tr. at 1366). As Singh explained when he pled guilty, by mid-2022, he “understood that Alameda was borrowing funds from FTX that belonged to other customers,” that “customers were not aware of this, and had not consented to such borrowing.” (Guilty Plea Tr. at 28). Nonetheless, because the overall balance across all the accounts on the spreadsheet showed that “Alameda had positive balances on FTX,” Singh did not appreciate the true implication of Alameda Research’s large negative balance in its main account. (Trial Tr. 1404). Additionally, while the spreadsheet showed a large negative balance in the fiat@ftx.com account, at that point Singh believed “Alameda had $11 billion in its bank account” corresponding to the fiat deposit number on FTX. (Trial Tr. at 1359-60). He was unaware that Bankman-Fried had authorized that money to be spent. After calculating Alameda Research’s balances, Bankman-Fried instructed Ellison to “go ahead and return the borrows” to “lenders who loaned Alameda money and were asking for it back.” (Tr. 440-41). But Singh was not involved in that decision and did not know that Bankman-Fried repaid Alameda Research’s lenders at that time.

Everything clicked for Singh in September 2022. On September 7, 2022, Bankman-Fried authored and circulated a Google Doc titled “We came, we saw, we researched,” in which he proposed shutting down Alameda Research. After Bankman-Fried circulated this proposal, he discussed it with Ellison, Wang, and Singh. In response, Singh proposed that rather than shutting down Alameda Research, they simply close out its accounts on FTX. Ellison told Singh that that was “impossible.” (Trial Tr. 1403). “At this point [Wang] said Alameda is borrowing 13 billion from FTX.” (Id.). Singh testified that he was “afraid” after hearing this, and then asked for a [ECF p. 4] meeting with Bankman-Fried, Wang, and Ellison. (Trial Tr. at 1403-04). Singh testified that when they met, Bankman-Fried “seemed unsurprised” by this information and made up what Singh “understood to be a false excuse for dodging [the] meeting.” (Trial Tr. 1404-05). Singh met with Wang and Ellison, and, as he testified, then understood that Alameda Research had been using billions of dollars of FTX customer funds. (Trial Tr. at 1405). Worse yet, it became clear to Singh then that Alameda Research was not going to be able to repay the funds it had taken. (Id.).

That evening, Singh asked for a one-on-one meeting with Bankman-Fried on the balcony of the penthouse apartment in which Singh and Bankman-Fried lived. (Trial Tr. at 1405). Singh testified in detail about this meeting at trial. According to Singh, he began the conversation with Bankman-Fried by telling him that he and Ellison were “freaked out” about Alameda Research’s net asset value. (Trial Tr. at 1406). After Bankman-Fried deflected, Singh raised the issue more directly, pointing out that “there’s 13 billion borrowed and we can’t pay it all.” (Trial Tr. at 1407). Finally engaging Singh, Bankman-Fried remarked, “Right, that. We are a little short on deliverable.” (Id.). Bankman-Fried conceded that “this has been taxing me some 5 to 10 percent of my productivity,” to which Singh countered, “this is going to be doing a lot more damage to me, hitting me a lot harder.” (Id.). Bankman-Fried expressed regret that he had shared the information with Singh. (Id.). During their meeting, Singh urged Bankman-Fried to reign in his spending—a request of Bankman-Fried that proved futile. (Trial Tr. at 1408-09).

After this realization, Singh considered quitting his job at FTX. He did not, however, leave the company. At trial, he explained that he decided not to quit because he believed it would contribute to the collapse of FTX. (Trial Tr. at 1409). Bankman-Fried had told Singh that their way out of the problem was to keep “making FTX successful and growing it,” and so Singh remained. (Trial Tr. at 1412). In his final months at FTX, despite knowing of the massive “hole” at FTX, Singh spent and/or approved spending millions in what were customers’ funds. Most of that spending was for corporate purposes: Singh approved transactions as one of FTX’s executives, he participated in a large capital expenditure by FTX, and he made political contributions with funds from FTX and Alameda Research (described below). (Guilty Plea Tr. at 28). Singh also completed the purchase of a home in the San Juan Islands for approximately $3.7 million, despite knowing that the money being withdrawn from FTX was necessarily customers’ money. (Trial Tr. at 1604).

At the same time, Singh also pushed Bankman-Fried to curtail his spending. He repeatedly told Bankman-Fried to cut down on endorsement deals, to stop acquisitions (such as for Embed and AZA), and to cancel plans for a new FTX office. (Trial Tr. at 1408-18). In total, Singh estimated at trial that he successfully convinced Bankman-Fried to cut “a couple hundred million dollars” in spending. (Trial Tr. at 1413-14). But at the same time, Bankman-Fried and FTX continued to engage in rampant spending. During this period, Singh learned about, and then confronted Bankman-Fried about, a series of large endorsement deals that Bankman-Fried had agreed to. (Trial Tr. at 1415). Bankman-Fried challenged Singh to identify a bad investment, and Singh identified several transactions he believed were “cuttable” or should be “strongly curtailed.” (Trial Tr. at 1414). But Bankman-Fried refused to change his spending. (Id.).

In October 2022, Bankman-Fried and another FTX employee went to the Middle East to meet with potential investors. While there, Bankman-Fried pitched to several FTX employees, [ECF p. 5] over Signal, the idea of purchasing Telegram for hundreds of millions of dollars. (Trial Tr. at 1416). Singh raised a number of objections to the deal, but was not “transparent about [his] worry that this was digging into customer funds.” (Trial Tr. at 1417). Bankman-Fried responded that they were “going ahead” with the deal and unless they had “any serious new objections” it would happen. (Id.).

A month later, a series of events spurred FTX’s collapse. On November 2, 2022, CoinDesk published an article disclosing a version of Alameda Research’s balance sheet. That news, followed by a tweet by the founder of Binance about selling FTT, caused panic amongst FTX users, prompting them to withdraw funds from the exchange. Around November 5, concerned about a “bank run,” Singh began tracking the withdrawals around this time and observed that the rate of net withdrawals was speeding up. (Trial Tr. at 1457). At the time, he was “very concerned that this might spell doom,” ending what had been a futile effort “to make customers whole” and the “ongoing fraud” in the process. (Id.). Bankman-Fried was focused on convincing customers not to withdraw their money, and on the evening of November 6, he was workshopping potential tweets to curb the withdrawals. (Trial Tr. at 1464). Bankman-Fried suggested several tweets characterizing FTX as “solvent” or “well capitalized.” (Id.). Singh was “very uncomfortable with both definitions” and believed “neither was true.” (Id.). He told Bankman-Fried that he was “not comfortable with this” and was “recusing” himself. (Id.). The next morning, without Singh’s involvement, Bankman-Fried tweeted, among other things, that “assets are fine”—a tweet that Singh testified was false. (Trial Tr. at 1465-66).

Singh was concerned not just about FTX’s collapse, but what would come of all of the loans in his name. For years, at Bankman-Fried’s request, Singh had been asked to take loans from FTX for corporate purposes, described below, including financing acquisitions and capitalizing FTX.us. (Trial Tr. at 1459). As FTX’s collapse was becoming a growing likelihood, Singh became “terrified” that he would not “be able to repay all [his] loans,” and that they would “look really corrupt.” (Trial Tr. at 1458, 1461). Singh asked Bankman-Fried over Signal about whether Bankman-Fried would be authorize a backdated transaction to relieve himself of loan obligations. (Trial Tr. at 1461). Bankman-Fried agreed to let Singh do it, although the transaction never ended up taking place. (Trial Tr. at 1461).

By November 8, Singh was not in “a right mind” and had been “suicidal for some days.” (Trial Tr. at 1461, 1473). As Can Sun described Singh in those final days, “it looked like his soul had been plucked away from him.” (Trial Tr. at 1958). Bankman-Fried told Singh that he was infecting the atmosphere and making it unproductive, while they were trying to raise equity investments. Singh then resigned to Bankman-Fried by email and left the Bahamas on November 10.

B. Fraud on FTX Investors and Auditors

In addition to accepting responsibility for his involvement in FTX’s fraud on its customers, Singh also took responsibility for actions he had taken previously to make FTX’s revenues appear higher than what they were. Those inflated figures were shared with investors.

[ECF p. 6]

Singh understood that Bankman-Fried was attempting to raise money from investors, and in connection with those efforts, Bankman-Fried was providing investors with FTX’s financial statements. Bankman-Fried was intent on being able to say that FTX revenue for 2021 was over $1 billion, but the revenue for the year was coming up short by approximately $50 million. (Trial Tr. at 1446). Bankman-Fried directed Singh to manufacture a series of backdated transactions related to the staking of Serum on FTX that amounted to $50 million, which then enabled Bankman-Fried to claim that FTX revenue for 2021 was over $1 billion. (Id.). Singh charged the “EcoSerum Foundation” (which Singh understood to effectively be controlled by Bankman-Fried) a 25% fee on staked rewards on FTX, which backed in to a $50 million receivable from EcoSerum to FTX. (Trial Tr. at 1447). Singh executed a number of payments from EcoSerum to FTX and backdated the transfers to make them appear as though they had been happening over time. (Trial Tr. at 1448-50). When Singh reviewed this information with auditors, he presented these payments as legitimate third-party transactions that took place periodically throughout, when in reality these were backdated transactions that involved Bankman-Fried transferring Serum funds that he controlled over to FTX to create the appearance of higher revenue. (Trial Tr. at 1452-53). Bankman-Fried later created a backdated document—which Singh was unaware of—to paper the backdated transaction. (Trial Tr. at 1453-54). As discussed below, Singh brought this information to the Government’s attention when he first began proffering.

Singh was also involved in a transaction, at Bankman-Fried’s direction, to shift losses incurred by FTX to Alameda Research, thereby removing them from FTX’s books and records. In 2021, an FTX user exploited a problem in FTX’s margin system and caused FTX to overvalue a cryptocurrency called MobileCoin, causing losses to FTX. (Trial Tr. at 1456). Bankman-Fried directed that the losses be booked to Alameda Research, not FTX, so that the “losses would not be publicly shared” with investors. (Id.).

While not a subject of his trial testimony or his guilty plea, Singh volunteered to the Government two other instances where he acted deceptively toward FTX’s auditors. In both instances, the Government was unaware of this conduct prior to Singh proffering about it, and it appears the conduct did not have a material effect on FTX’s audited financials. First, during FTX’s audit in 2021 (for the years 2019/2020), and again during the 2022 audit (for 2021), the auditors asked Singh for a breakdown for how much stablecoin belonged to customers and how much belonged to FTX. Singh brought the issue to Bankman-Fried and Wang, who tried unsuccessfully to write code to compute customer balances. Singh instead showed them a nonfunctional piece of code, misrepresenting to the auditors that the code had generated the stablecoin balances, when it had in fact come from a computation. The derivation was therefore fabricated, although Singh maintains that he believes the number was correct (and the Government has no reason to believe otherwise). Second, Singh told the auditors that there was a multi-signatory process for FTX’s cold wallets, when that was not the case.

Finally, as Singh stated at his guilty plea, after learning about Bankman-Fried’s use of customer funds in September 2022, Singh “understood … implicitly that [Bankman-Fried] would not share FTX’s full financial condition” with prospective investors. (Guilty Plea Tr. at 30).

[ECF p. 7]

C. Campaign Finance Violations and Money Laundering

Prior to joining Alameda Research and FTX, Singh had been passionate about effective altruism and donating a large portion of his earnings to charity. In 2020, Sam Bankman-Fried emailed Singh and told him that he was going to start making political donations, largely advised by his mother Barbara Fried, and offered that she could also advise Singh if he was interested in donating. Singh made a $1 million contribution to a political action committee advised by Bankman-Fried’s mother, as well as several other PACs recommended by her. While those early contributions were targeted towards organizations that Singh believed were consistent with his values, near the end of 2021, Bankman-Fried and his brother asked Singh to start making more contributions to help their efforts in the 2022 midterm elections.

Over the course of 2022, Singh was enlisted in an effort to make large, coordinated donations to candidates favored by Bankman-Fried and his advisors. As conceived of by Bankman-Fried, Salame made donations to Republican candidates, Singh made donations to largely progressive Democratic candidates, and Bankman-Fried hewed closer to the center left. The donations were part of a collective effort to advance Bankman-Fried’s political objectives and FTX’s business purposes, as well as effective altruism. As one of Bankman-Fried’s advisers described it to Singh over Signal, “in general, you being the center left face of our spending will mean you giving to a lot of woke shit for transactional purposes.” (GX-477). As part of that effort, some donations were made directly to individual politicians and some were made to PACs. Over time, Singh made contributions at the direction of others without much input into the ultimate recipients—at times, he even donated to candidates whom he otherwise would not personally support financially. As Singh told one of Bankman-Fried’s political advisers over Signal while pushing back against a contribution he had been asked to make, “I don’t love boxing myself into only associating with people I don’t like.” (GX-477).

Because of the amount of donations being made in Singh’s name, Bankman-Fried directed Salame to fund Singh’s bank accounts and make the donations. For some of the contributions, particularly many of the donations toward the end of 2022, Bankman-Fried or one of his advisers identified who Singh would contribute to and the amount of the contribution; Salame then transferred funds to Singh’s account from Alameda Research so as to fund the contribution; Salame then queued up a donation from Singh’s account; Singh approved the bank transfer (as was necessary for the bank to process it); and then the funds went out. Someone else—not Singh—filled out the donation forms for Singh’s contributions. Some of Singh’s contributions were funded using money transferred from Alameda Research’s funds, which Singh understood as loans he was required to pay back. Other donations were paid for through margin borrowing on FTX, followed by withdrawals, that Singh did through his FTX account. While Singh had sufficient funds in his account to cover the withdrawals, because they were borrowing on his personal line of credit at FTX, by September 2022 he knew those withdrawals were effectively drawing on FTX customer funds.

Many of the requests for Singh to contribute came over Signal, in chats with Bankman-Fried, Singh, and Bankman-Fried’s other political advisers. In one chat, which was produced to the Government by Singh, called “Donation Processing,” contributions were proposed and coordinated amongst a group. Salame often messaged the group, tagging Singh, saying that he had [ECF p. 8] prepared the donations and that Singh just needed to approve. In one chat, for example, Salame wrote, “SBFs are all queued and sent. @Nishad Singh you got about 30 small dollar ones rolling in if you can confirm in your email.” In another Signal chat, also produced by Singh, one of Bankman-Fried’s advisers proposed making many contributions in Singh’s name through an online payment processor, and when they ran into technical problems, Singh was asked to sign dozens of checks that were used to make donations.

The transfers to Singh, Salame, and Bankman-Fried for purposes of making political donations were often recorded in Alameda Research’s general ledger as “expenses” or “loans.” There was no documentation establishing the existence of a real loan for any of these transfers. Singh believed that he owed money back to Alameda Research—and that belief is corroborated by documentary evidence—but Bankman-Fried and Salame did not share that belief or express that the money would be repaid.

While Singh contributed a large amount of money to candidates and PACs in 2022, his involvement in those contributions was comparatively minor. He was, in every sense, a straw donor. Singh understood that the donations were “for the benefit of” Bankman-Fried and his quest to be “politically influential,” and he “understood that any reporting of the donations would conceal that the money came from Alameda [Research].” (Guilty Plea Tr. at 33). At the time Singh made contributions in the fall of 2022, he understood that the “money had to be coming, effectively, from FTX customer funds.” (Id.). The Government debriefed Singh extensively about his understanding (or lack of understanding) about the campaign finance laws, and as Singh described at his guilty plea, unlike Bankman-Fried and Singh, he “wasn’t familiar with the campaign finance rules.” (Id.). Nonetheless, while he was “not sure whether [his] conduct was unlawful,” he knew it was “wrong,” and he “chose not to ask questions.” (Id.).

Singh’s involvement in these illegal contributions provided the factual basis for his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit campaign finance violations and money laundering. It also provided the basis for charging Bankman-Fried with conspiracy to commit campaign finance violations, and a basis for charging him with conspiracy to commit money laundering. While the Bahamas did not grant the United States permission to try Bankman-Fried for conspiracy to commit campaign finance violations after he was extradited, the Government proved this conduct at his trial and relied on it at Bankman-Fried’s sentencing.

D. Loans and Singh’s Spending in the Fall of 2022

In proffers with the Government, and to a limited extent during his trial testimony, Singh described his involvement in the following transactions: (i) large loans that were made from Alameda Research to Singh; (ii) a $10 million loan to Singh in April 2021; and (iii) spending by Singh in the fall of 2022. Information on each of those transactions is set forth below.

First, Singh received over $500 million in “loans” from Alameda Research. None of those loans flowed to Singh personally and he was not charged with any crimes relating to them. Rather, as was the case with loans made to Wang, these loans were directed by Bankman-Fried in order to effect transactions that benefited FTX enterprise. FTX.us needed money to make acquisitions but did not have the money. Bankman-Fried proposed to Singh and Wang that Alameda would loan [ECF p. 9] them money and they would invest that money in FTX, which would spend the money on acquisitions. Singh had to sign documents accepting the loans but the decision had been made and it felt like a foregone conclusion. Between approximately May 2021 and September 2022, there were loans of approximately $100 million from Alameda that went through Singh that were used to help capitalize FTX US and to pay for the buyout of Binance. Singh accepted these loans because Bankman-Fried told them they were necessary, and attorneys were involved in papering the transactions. With one exception—an investment relating to Embed—Singh did not know about the “hole” at FTX when he agreed to the “loans.” The venture investment in Embed occurred in the fall of 2022 and was something that Singh objected to, but ultimately signed off on after being pressured by Bankman-Fried.

In 2021, Singh sought to exercise his equity options in FTX for the purpose of either donating the options or selling then and donating the proceeds. (Trial Tr. at 1514). To fund that equity purchase, Singh planned to sell his FTT and other crypto holdings. But Bankman-Fried asked Singh to, instead, take on a $477 million loan from Alameda Research to fund the acquisition of the FTX shares he was entitled to at a strike price four times higher than what he was entitled to. Bankman-Fried benefited by structuring the transaction in this way: it prevented the sale of FTT, it valued FTX’s shares at a higher amount, and it benefited FTX from a tax perspective. No money was ever received by Singh. Like the prior loans, nothing about this structure benefited Singh.

Second, in April 2021, long before knowing of Bankman-Fried’s misuse of FTX’s customer’s funds, Singh wanted to sell a portion of his FTT holdings to pay some expenses and provide financial assistance to family members. Bankman-Fried was hostile to that idea because he did not want Singh or other employees to sell FTT. Bankman-Fried told Singh that instead of selling FTT, he should take a loan. Singh took a loan of $10 million, transferred from Alameda Research, and used it to pay taxes, provide financial assistance to family, and make a charitable contribution. Singh was not charged with any crime relating to this withdrawal. Nonetheless, as his submission notes, he has been exploring whether there are funds that he could recover and return to the bankruptcy estate.

Third, after Singh’s conversations with Bankman-Fried in early September 2022, he understood that any spending coming from Alameda Research was likely at the expense of FTX’s customers. Nonetheless, in addition to making political expenditures, Singh spent approximately $3.7 million on the purchase of a home in the San Juan Islands. (Trial Tr. at 1604). Singh had been working to buy the home prior to learning about the “hole” at FTX, but he went through with the transaction. He has since expressed significant remorse for doing so, and forfeited the home without ever having lived there. (Trial Tr. at 1619).