[This part begins partway down ECF page 9.]
II. Procedural History
On November 10, 2022, Singh left the Bahamas and traveled to the United States. On November 14, 2022—three days after FTX’s bankruptcy declaration—Singh had his counsel reach out to the Government. One week later, on November 21, 2022, Singh met with the Government and began proffering. He was the fourth FTX or Alameda Research employee the Government met with, following Wang and two lower level employees. A day before his first meeting with the [ECF p. 10] Government, Singh produced screenshots he had taken of Signal communications with Bankman-Fried, Wang, and Ellison, as well as a copy of the “We came, we saw, we researched” Google Doc that became an important trial exhibit. Singh made another production on November 22, 2022, which was the day after his first proffer. The Government did not have any of these materials before Singh produced them.
During his second proffer, on November 22, Singh described for the Government significant criminal activity involving Bankman-Fried that the Government was not previously aware of. That included the political contribution scheme and misleading conduct towards FTX’s auditors. Singh subsequently provided documents relating to the campaign finance violations which, together with his information, formed the primary basis for the campaign finance charges against Bankman-Fried.
On December 9, 2022, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of New York returned an eight-count Indictment charging Bankman-Fried with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit commodities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to defraud the United States and commit campaign finance violations. The charges against Bankman-Fried were unsealed on December 13, 2022, the same day the SEC and CFTC announced the initiation of civil proceedings against Bankman-Fried, and after Bankman-Fried was arrested in the Bahamas on a federal arrest warrant.
On February 28, 2023, Singh pleaded guilty before the Court pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the Government. Singh pleaded guilty to a Superseding Information that charged him in six counts with: (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; (2) wire fraud on customers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; (3) conspiracy to commit commodities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (4) conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (5) conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and (6) conspiracy to commit campaign finance offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Singh was uninvolved in the wire fraud on Alameda Research’s lenders and as a result he did not plead guilty to wire fraud on lenders.
Subsequent to his guilty plea, Singh met with the Government at least 20 times, and spent additional time outside of these meetings reviewing computer code, documents, emails, Signal messages, and spreadsheets in order to identify and decode relevant documents for the Government.
Singh testified at Bankman-Fried’s trial in October 2023 for approximately two days. At the conclusion of the trial, Bankman-Fried was convicted on all seven counts of the superseding indictment. Bankman-Fried was not tried on the campaign finance offenses with which he was charged because the Bahamas did not consent to him being tried on those charges. Nonetheless, Singh testified about that conduct at Bankman-Fried’s trial, and the information Singh provided was instrumental in bringing charges against Salame, who pleaded guilty on September 7, 2023, and was sentenced on May 28, 2024.
III. The Presentence Investigation Report and the Applicable Guidelines Range
The United States Probation Office issued a final Presentence Investigation Report on September 27, 2024. In the PSR, the Probation Office calculates the otherwise applicable Guidelines sentence to be life imprisonment, based on an offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I. (PSR ¶ 101). Because this exceeds the statutorily authorized maximum sentence, the guideline term of imprisonment is 900 months. (Id.). The calculations of the Probation Office are set forth in paragraphs 51 through 66 of the Presentence Report. The offense level is driven principally by the loss amount of over $10 billion, which under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P), results in a 30-level increase to the offense level. (PSR ¶ 56).
IV. Singh’s Cooperation and the Significance of his Assistance
Under Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines, the appropriate reduction in a defendant’s sentence for his cooperation is determined based on, among other things, “the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance,” the “truthfulness, completeness, and reliability” of his information, the “nature and extent” of his cooperation, and the “timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.” As measured by those factors, Singh’s cooperation was not only timely and significant, but exemplary.
A. The Timeliness of Singh’s Cooperation
Singh’s cooperation was very timely. On November 14, 2022, he directed his attorneys to reach out to the Government, and on November 18, his attorneys communicated information that Singh could provide at a meeting. On November 21, one week after FTX declared bankruptcy, Singh met with the Government and was debriefed over the course of two days. He was the fourth witness to meet with the Government, appearing a week after Wang and two lower-level employees, and before Ellison. Singh’s interest in providing assistance was genuine from the outset. He came in voluntarily and his meeting with the Government was initiated by his counsel. Based on information known to the Government, Singh made his decision to cooperate and come in without knowledge that other individuals had begun proffering, and without any law enforcement action. Measured against almost any other white collar prosecution, the timeliness of Singh’s cooperation was extraordinary.
The timeliness of Singh’s assistance was not limited to meetings with the Government. Before he began meeting with the Government, Singh took steps to preserve Signal messages with Bankman-Fried and other coconspirators. That assistance was essential: the messages were set to auto-delete and would have been destroyed by the application by the time of Singh’s first meeting with the Government had he not acted to preserve evidence when he did. The timeliness of Singh’s preservation efforts ensured that the Government had access to Signal messages it would not have otherwise obtained (and indeed never did obtain from other sources) including Singh’s one-on-one conversations with Bankman-Fried over Signal, and Singh’s communications about making straw donations.
The timeliness of Singh’s assistance contributed to the Government’s ability to seek an indictment against Bankman-Fried. Indeed, Singh alerted the Government to Bankman-Fried’s campaign finance offenses long before the Government would have otherwise discovered the [ECF p. 12] conduct from bank records or other witnesses. While it was not ultimately a charged offense at trial because the Bahamas did not consent to Bankman-Fried being tried for the offense, without Singh’s early assistance the campaign finance charge would not have been part of the Indictment.
B. The Nature, Extent, Usefulness and Significance of Singh’s Cooperation
Singh’s information and testimony were critical to bringing charges against Bankman-Fried and Salame, securing a conviction at trial against Bankman-Fried and a guilty plea from Salame, and tracing assets that have been forfeited as crime proceeds. Singh provided useful and significant cooperation in the following ways: (i) he provided testimony about and evidence of Bankman-Fried’s involvement in the fraud on FTX’s customers; (ii) he identified additional crimes that Bankman-Fried and Salame had participated in, and provided important documentary evidence not previously in the Government’s possession; (iii) he assisted other governmental agencies and the bankruptcy estate; and (iv) he aided in the recovery of assets.
First, Singh provided significant assistance in the investigation of the collapse of FTX and the prosecution of Bankman-Fried. During his first interview with the Government, Singh described in detail FTX’s computer code and the hidden special advantages that had been granted to Alameda Research. That information was important because it helped to reveal one of the ways in which Bankman-Fried misappropriated customers’ money. More importantly, in recounting Bankman-Fried’s involvement in directing those secret privileges in FTX’s computer code, Singh established the falsity of Bankman-Fried’s repeated claim that he barely knew how to code and did not know about Alameda Research’s secret privileges. The only other person in a position to describe the code and Bankman-Fried’s involvement in it was Gary Wang, whom Singh corroborated, demonstrating that Wang was not the chief architect of the hidden advantages for Alameda in FTX’s code.
Singh also aided the Government significantly in determining how Bankman-Fried spent customers’ money. As Singh’s trial testimony made clear, he was intimately familiar with many of Bankman-Fried’s large expenditures in 2022. Singh recounted Bankman-Fried’s spending on real estate, celebrity endorsements, risky venture investments, speculative crypto investments, and other items. That included the Orchid penthouse, which Bankman-Fried wanted to purchase because he was a “fan of views” and “really liked” it (Trial Tr. at 1340), and an investment in K5, which Bankman-Fried fancied because it boosted his social standing with politicians and celebrities (Trial Tr. at 1328). While Singh often learned of large expenditures after the fact, he testified that he would “frequently go to Sam” and express his concerns. (Trial Tr. at 1312). That testimony was critical. It undermined Bankman-Fried’s false claim that he had no motive to commit the charged crimes because he was an effective altruist. And it also undermined Bankman-Fried’s false suggestion that he was not responsible for Alameda Research’s spending. Singh put the lie to that narrative, testifying at length about how Bankman-Fried was unwilling to curb his oversized spending. As Singh described at trial, Singh took public and private stands against Bankman-Fried’s excessive spending only to face “public humiliation” and anger from Bankman-Fried. (Trial Tr. at 1313). Singh’s testimony went hand-in-hand with the expert testimony tracing Bankman-Fried’s spending of FTX customer funds.
Singh did not just describe Bankman-Fried’s spending, he produced and identified records demonstrating Bankman-Fried’s spending. In some instances, Singh collected records and provided them to the Government before the Government had access to them. In other instances, Singh described important documents in his early proffer sessions, and then when he subsequently reviewed discovery materials, he identified those documents.
Most significantly, Singh testified in detail about his conversations with Bankman-Fried in September through November 2022. Consistent with the testimony of Ellison and Wang, Singh described Bankman-Fried’s proposal in September 2022 that he shut down Alameda Research, and how that conversation made explicit the reality that Alameda Research had taken at least $13 billion from FTX customers. Recognizing the significance of that conversation, Singh produced the Google Doc that Bankman-Fried had created before he ever started proffering with the Government. And he made this disclosure in his very first meeting, even though he was implicating himself in the fraud on FTX customers in the process.
Perhaps the single most important piece of information provided by Singh was his telling of the conversation he had with Bankman-Fried on the balcony of the Orchid penthouse. Singh described the conversation in detail, consistently, in his meetings with the Government and at trial. In that meeting, Singh and Bankman-Fried discussed explicitly how that was “13 billion borrowed and we can’t pay it all,” how Bankman-Fried had been aware of that fact for some time, and how it was important that they curtail spending. The implication of that conversation, which was featured in the Government’s summations, was that Bankman-Fried was aware of the fraud and knew what he was doing was wrong. The testimony was important to rebut one of Bankman-Fried’s defenses: that he was unaware of the fraud, did not know what position they were in financially, and only learned about Alameda Research’s finances in the final days of FTX. Thus, Singh’s testimony not only established Bankman-Fried’s knowing commission of the fraud, but it corroborated the testimony of Wang and Ellison about Bankman-Fried’s involvement. Such corroboration was crucial given that Bankman-Fried had taken pains throughout the conspiracy to avoid a paper trial and to delegate actions to Ellison, who authored many of the most incriminating documents at Bankman-Fried’s direction. Absent Singh’s testimony, Bankman-Fried’s effort to falsely implicate Ellison as the sole decisionmaker and to impugn her credibility might have gained more traction. But Ellison’s testimony, coupled with Singh’s corroboration, provided proof beyond any reasonable doubt that Bankman-Fried had criminal knowledge and intent, and was the architect of the scheme.
Singh also provided significant testimony concerning Bankman-Fried’s tweets in November 2022. In early November, Bankman-Fried was focused on convincing customers not to withdraw their money and was proposing “strong” tweets to curb the withdrawals. (Trial Tr. at 1464). As he testified, Singh believed tweets characterizing FTX as “solvent” or “well capitalized” were false and misleading, and expressed as much to Bankman-Fried. (Id.). Bankman-Fried then posted a series of false tweets. Singh’s description of this moment at trial was important not only because it established that Bankman-Fried’s tweets were false; his testimony also proved that Bankman-Fried knew his tweets were false and deceptive before they were made. Like his other testimony, Singh’s information rebutted one of Bankman-Fried’s trial defenses, that he did not know his tweets were false, and did not intend to mislead when he tweeted.
Second, Singh provided significant assistance by identifying criminal activity by Bankman-Fried and Salame, which would have otherwise taken a substantial amount of time to discover—indeed, some of it may never have been discovered. At Bankman-Fried’s sentencing, the Court observed that Bankman-Fried “set up a vehicle for making political donations … through straws that wouldn’t come back to him” and in the process perpetrated one of “the biggest political financial crimes in history.” (Bankman-Fried Sent. Tr. at 50). Singh is singularly responsible for bringing that crime to the Government’s attention. During his initial two-day meeting with the Government, Singh identified this conduct. At the time, the Government was entirely unaware of this criminal conduct and was not conducting any investigation that would have surfaced this illegal donation scheme. Because the straw donations were made in relatively low-dollar amounts, where transferred across multiple accounts, were communicated about over Signal, and were described as “loans” in Alameda Research’s books, it is plausible that the Government may never have discovered or been in a position to prove Bankman-Fried’s involvement in these campaign finance violations. In fact, in addition to Singh’s testimony, most of the Government’s evidence of campaign finance violations came in the form of Signal messages that had been screenshotted by Singh. Had Singh not preserved and produced those records, the Government would have never gotten access to them. Moreover, without Singh’s information and cooperation, Salame never would have been prosecuted for campaign finance offenses. In short, Singh deserves enormous credit for bringing this criminal conduct to the Government’s attention, even though it meant implicating himself in the process. Bankman-Fried’s campaign finance violations would have, alone, been a historic case, and Singh’s assistance in the investigation and prosecutions for those crimes cannot be overstated.
Although the Government could not proceed at Bankman-Fried’s trial on the campaign finance charge, because the Bahamas did not consent to Bankman-Fried being tried for the offense (as is required by law for an extradited defendant), the evidence was still an important piece of the trial proof. The evidence established one of the forms in which Bankman-Fried laundered funds from Alameda Research. The acts of concealment entailed in the campaign finance scheme was evidence of Bankman-Fried’s intent in connection with the fraud on customers. And the fact that Bankman-Fried was the person to benefit from the political donations aided in establishing that it was Bankman-Fried, not Ellison, who directed Alameda Research’s spending of funds.
Singh is singularly responsible for identifying certain fraudulent actions Bankman-Fried took with respect to FTX’s investors and auditor. As described above, Singh brought to the Government’s attention the backdated Serum transaction that Bankman-Fried orchestrated. Like the campaign finance violations, the Government was unaware of that criminal conduct, and was unlikely to have discovered it without Singh’s assistance. The same goes for other deceptive acts that Bankman-Fried instructed Singh to take with respect to FTX’s auditors.
Third, as confirmed by SEC and CFTC, Singh also provided valuable assistance to the SEC and CFTC in their parallel investigations for similar reasons. From his first proffer, Singh answered questions in a room filled with law enforcement agents, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and representatives from the SEC and CFTC who were conducting their own parallel investigations. Based on conversations with the SEC and our review of the SEC’s civil complaints, we understand that the SEC’s civil complaints relied in part on information provided by Singh or corroborated by [ECF p. 15] him. In addition to the SEC’s interest in the fraud on FTX investors, Singh provided the SEC with detailed information about FTX’s auditor.
With respect to the CFTC, Singh provided substantial assistance to the CFTC in its civil enforcement actions against Bankman-Fried and the FTX and Alameda Research entities, as well as in related matters involving possible violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. Singh entered into a written cooperation agreement with the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement on January 20, 2023, and on February 28, 2023, Singh entered into a Consent Order of Judgement on Liability as to the CFTC’s civil charges against him. See CFTC v. Singh, No. 23-cv-1684 (S.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 17. In that order, Mr. Singh admitted that he engaged in the charged conduct and accepted responsibility for his actions. Both before and after the date of Singh’s cooperation agreement with the CFTC, he provided material assistance in connection with the CFTC’s action against FTX, Alameda Research, and Bankman-Fried. The CFTC’s action against the FTX and Alameda Research entities resulted in a $12.7 billion consent judgment, with all monetary relief to be used to compensate to FTX customers and victims of FTX’s fraud. See Consent Order For Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief Against Defendants FTX Trading Ltd. d/b/a FTX.com and Alameda Research, LCC, CFTC v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22-cv-10503 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2024), ECF No. 44. The CFTC’s action against Bankman-Fried continues, and Singh has agreed to continue providing information to the CFTC, and to testify in that action, as needed.
Singh also cooperated with three investigations being conducted by state authorities. He participated in interviews with two state investigatory authorities to assist them in their investigations, and produced documents to a third state authority. Singh has reached a settlement with the civil MDL plaintiffs, participated in an interview with them, helped the FTX debtors as part of the bankruptcy, will soon be interviewed by the estate, and met with the bankruptcy court Examiner as part of its inquiry.
Singh also assisted the Department of Justice’s National Cryptocurrency Enforcement Team and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia in connection with a separate investigation concerning the hack of FTX by answering questions about, among other things, how FTX held assets and its security protocols.
Finally, Singh has provided substantial assistance in the recovery of victims’ money. While working at FTX, Singh agreed to forgo cash bonuses, and around the time of FTX’s bankruptcy he did not seek to withdraw or sell any of his assets. Rather, Singh preserved his assets to be forfeited, and consented to their forfeiture. He has agreed, among other things, to the forfeiture of his shares of an artificial intelligence company, now valued at millions more than what he purchased them at. He has also agreed to forfeit the home in the San Juan Islands that he purchased. And he has agreed to forfeit funds to the Government reflecting earnings when he was employed at FTX.
C. Singh’s Truthfulness and Reliability
Singh’s testimony was truthful and was corroborated by other evidence. From his first meeting, Singh took responsibility for his involvement in the fraud on FTX’s customers. While he certainly became involved later than some other participants, and did not have a leading role in the [ECF p. 16] fraud, Singh nonetheless took responsibility for his conduct, was prepared to plead guilty, and did plead guilty for his involvement in those crimes.
What is particularly notable about Singh is that of the crimes that he pleaded guilty to, it was only the fraud on FTX’s customers that the Government was aware of prior to Singh proffering with the Government. He brought to the Government’s attention the conduct that was the basis for his plea to conspiracy to commit securities fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and conspiracy to commit campaign finance violations. The Government debriefed Singh over a series of proffer sessions about his involvement in the straw donor scheme and his understanding of the campaign finance rules. While Singh could have entirely shirked responsibility by claiming that he did not believe he was doing anything wrong, he instead was careful in explaining his understanding: he admitted in his guilty plea that he knew what he was doing was wrong and had consciously avoided confirming the conduct’s illegality.
Singh was fully committed to cooperation. He made seven cross-country trips to New York. He met with prosecutors and regulators on at least 25 occasions often for many hours. His disclosures were complete. He brought information and evidence to the Government’s attention, and the information uncovered by the Government in its own investigation corroborated things that Singh disclosed previously.
V. Restitution and Remission
At Bankman-Fried’s sentencing, the Court declined to order restitution “due to the complexity of the case and the number of victims,” and instead granted the Government’s motion to authorize the United States to compensate victims with finally forfeited assets through a remission process. (Dkt. 424 at 6). The Court ordered the same at Ellison’s sentencing. The Court should do the same here. As explained in the Government’s submission ahead of Bankman-Fried’s sentencing, ordering restitution would be extremely costly and administratively impractical in this case. See Dkt. 410 at 109-112. Therefore, the Government seeks to return all stolen assets to victims through a remission process, consistent with its frequent approach in complex fraud cases with numerous victims. See id. at 110 (citing United States v. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (DC), Dkt. 106 & United States v. Bonventre, 10 Cr. 228, Dkt. 318 (Madoff Ponzi scheme); United States v. Sharma, 18 Cr. 340, Dkt. 407 (multi-million dollar cryptocurrency scheme); United States v. Dos Santos, 20 Cr. 398, Dkt. 283 (multi-million dollar cryptocurrency scheme)).
Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court include the following language regarding restitution in its sentence and judgment:
The Court declines to order restitution, based on its finding that determining complex issues of fact related to the cause and amount of the victim’s losses would complicate and prolong the sentencing process. It instead grants the government’s motion to authorize the United States to compensate victims with finally forfeited assets through a remission process, as restitution would be impractical in this case.
VI. Conclusion
The Government believes that Singh provided substantial assistance to the Government in its investigation and prosecution of wrongdoers, and in its recovery of assets for victims. Accordingly, as discussed, assuming Singh continues to comply with the terms of his cooperation agreement, the Government intends to request at sentencing that the Court sentence Singh in light of the factors set forth in Section 5K1.1(a) of the Guidelines.
Respectfully submitted,
DAMIAN WILLIAMS
United States Attorney
By: /s/ Nicolas Roos
Danielle R. Sassoon
Danielle Kudla
Thane Rehn
Nicolas Roos
Assistant United States Attorneys
Southern District of New York
cc: Andrew D. Goldstein, Esq. (by ECF)
Russell Capone, Esq.
Anupam Dhillon, Esq.