Sentencing Submission on Behalf of Nishad Singh, part 3 of 6 (ECF pages 25 to 36)

[ECF p. 25]

III. NISHAD’S ROLE IN THE OFFENSE CONDUCT

On February 28, 2023, Nishad pled guilty before the Court to a six-count indictment, taking responsibility for his participation in three different schemes: customer fraud, investor fraud, and campaign finance violations. See ECF Nos. 90–91. We address the factual predicates for each of these below, as well as Nishad’s role relative to the other defendants.

A. Customer Fraud (Counts One, Two, and Three)

The customer fraud counts focus on Alameda’s theft of roughly $8 billion from FTX customers. Though it had been going on for years, Nishad only learned about the fraud in September of 2022, two months before FTX’s collapse. As the trial evidence made clear, Nishad neither orchestrated nor planned the fraud, nor had he been among its facilitators for the vast majority of its existence. As the Probation Department notes in the Final Presentence Report, though Bankman-Fried’s scheme involved the loss of billions of dollars in customer funds, “much of [it] predated Singh’s involvement.” PSR ¶ 42, pg. 40. In these regards, Nishad is not similarly situated to his co-conspirators, who knew about and took steps to further the fraud over the course of a far longer time period.

1. Relative Knowledge and Conduct of Cooperators

To the extent that there was an “inner circle” aware of the customer fraud scheme, Nishad was not part of it until near the end. By contrast, Gary Wang and Caroline Ellison knew in 2019 that Bankman-Fried was lying to customers and stealing their funds. Ellison testified that even before she became CEO of Alameda, when she was still a trader, she learned directly from Bankman-Fried that Alameda was taking FTX customer funds. Trial Tr. at 653:12–21. After becoming CEO of Alameda, she agreed with Bankman-Fried to use FTX customer funds as a source of capital for various investments and expenditures. Id. at 654:2–6, 644:13–18 (“Alameda took several billion dollars of money from FTX customers and used it for our own investments and to repay debts that we had.”). In June of 2022, when the cryptocurrency market crashed and Alameda’s lenders called their loans, Ellison – at Bankman-Fried’s direction – repaid Alameda’s lenders using billions of dollars in FTX customer assets. Id. at 808:17–21. Nishad was not a part [ECF p. 26] of that decision and did not learn until later that customer funds were being used to shore up Alameda’s finances.

Wang similarly testified to knowing that Alameda was misappropriating customer funds early in the scheme. In particular, Wang testified that he learned in late 2019 or early 2020 that Alameda had a negative balance of “around $200 million” at a time when FTX had trading revenue of “around $150 million.” Trial Tr. at 376:14–21, 377:13–19. From this, Wang recognized “that Alameda was taking customers’ money.” Id. at 377:2–4. He discussed the matter with Bankman-Fried, who continued permitting Alameda to withdraw customer funds. Id. at 377:20–25. Wang then engaged in additional conduct over the course of months and years that furthered the customer fraud scheme. Id. at 367:20–24, 373:9–14, 374:10–17 (changing functionality of the “allow negative” flag to prevent Alameda from being liquidated, at Bankman-Fried’s direction).

2. 2019: Allow-Negative and Alameda’s Banking Setup

Alameda was able to access FTX customer funds in two ways: (1) by making use of customer fiat withdrawals into Alameda bank accounts; and (2) by withdrawing crypto in a “negative” amount – effectively making use of customer funds – via an “allow negative” functionality in the FTX code. Although Nishad implemented the initial version of the “allow negative” functionality in July 2019 at Wang and Bankman-Fried’s direction, at the time, the functionality was not intended (at least insofar as Nishad, and even Wang at first, understood) to be used in an improper matter. As both Nishad and Wang testified, the original purpose of the allow negative function was to facilitate the transfer of locked forms of FTT from several accounts, including Alameda’s.10 Trial Tr. at 352:22–25, 353:8–12, 1365:19–23. The feature would go on to be used by other developers, too, for legitimate purposes. Nishad and other engineers knew that [ECF p. 27] Alameda had access to accounts with the allow-negative function; what was secret and unknown to them at the time was that Bankman-Fried, as the de facto head of both Alameda and FTX, was abusing the function to steal funds.

10 The “allow negative” code change was made the day after the FTT token was launched and was executed in a manner transparent to other developers. The feature updated a page that all FTX staff could access, allowing them to transfer different types of FTT tokens from specific accounts, including some belonging to Alameda. This page also specified which accounts to use for various FTT transactions. “Allow negative” was also used to facilitate on-chain token staking with designated customer funds (i.e. interest payments paid for cryptocurrency that is subject to a lockup period where no trading is permitted), and converting cryptocurrency into fiat currency (also known as “fiat settlement”). As with locked FTT transfers, Alameda’s account was used to facilitate these types of transactions, which required it to go negative for temporary periods and by relatively incidental amounts.

With respect to fiat, it was widely known within the companies – including by Nishad – that FTX customer fiat deposits were, for some time, made directly into Alameda bank accounts. See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 1356:14–19. Alameda was supposed to track this fiat using “an accounting-orientated account” on FTX’s database referred to as “fiat@FTX.com.” Id. at 1351:17–19. As Ellison explained, “if a customer deposited money into an Alameda bank account, then there would be a negative ledger entry created in this account to offset the money that Alameda was receiving,” and in the event of a customer withdrawal, there should have been a positive ledger entry created. Id. at 655:15–656:4. As early as December 2019, based on conversations that he overheard, Nishad believed that the fiat@ account was being tracked by Alameda employees in order for Alameda to verify the amount of customer funds it was required to have in bank accounts. Id. at 1354:17–1355:11. In either November or December 2021, after an accounting error was discovered for the first time (referred to as the “bug” during trial), Nishad specifically asked Ellison whether Alameda was tracking the fiat@ account, and she confirmed that it was. Id. at 1517:17–19, 1520:4–9.

In other words, for most of FTX’s existence, although he was aware of the “allow negative” functionality and of the custodying of FTX customer funds with Alameda, Nishad did not know that Alameda was using these structures to misappropriate customer funds, and played no role in the customer fraud scheme. Nor did he need to know this information to carry out his principal role at FTX – managing other members of FTX’s engineering team. Even as Nishad pushed back against Bankman-Fried’s excesses over the years and worried that some of it “wreaked [sic] of excess and flashiness,” Trial Tr. at 1313:1–7, he did not know until the fall of 2022 that the reality was far worse: not only was Bankman-Fried extremely cavalier with the company’s finances, he was using customer assets to do so.

[ECF p. 28]

3. June 2022: Nishad Learns of the Abuse of “Allow Negative”

In June 2022, Nishad participated in an effort to determine the amount of money that Alameda had on FTX. Trial Tr. at 1346:8–1347:18. Nishad was looped into this project by Ellison, not because of his accounting expertise or familiarity with Alameda’s finances, but because the project required reviewing FTX’s database, and he “had comfort in those technical systems.” Id. at 1347:9–18. As the Government elicited from Nishad at trial, he had no “involvement . . . [in] looking at Alameda’s balances prior to June 2022, and while the project did not “fit into [his] overall responsibilities at FTX,” Nishad “didn’t have any hesitation about jumping on things that needed help.” Id. at 1347:2–11. Once he was looped in, Nishad asked Wang “how [he] could help” because he “wasn’t sure what the areas of uncertainty might be” for this project. Id. at 1348:9–11. Wang instructed Nishad to identify any account on FTX that belonged to Alameda or Bankman-Fried, and so Nishad attempted to do so. Id. at 1348:11–15. “Gary thought it was not a great attempt, so he took his own stab at it” and Nishad “deleted [his] page” and “went with Gary’s.” Id. at 1348:15–17.

The resulting page Wang created showed Nishad that Alameda had used the “allow negative” flag to incur a negative $2.7 billion balance in its main account—which “seriously concerned” him because it “seemed like a real abuse of a feature that until this point [he] believed was serving FTX, not hurting it.” Trial Tr. 1366:11–16. Prior to this point, as noted above, Nishad believed that Alameda’s use of “allow negative” was in service of legitimate, non-controversial purposes, such as converting cryptocurrency into fiat currency. These uses would have resulted in accounts going “negative for incidental reasons and in small amounts and then . . . would be topped off shortly after,” but as Nishad testified, $2.7 billion was “not a small amount” and did “not strike” him “as incidental.” Id. at 1367:12–17.

Despite being troubled, Nishad was unaware of what the $2.7 billion figure represented, and it appeared to be exceeded by positive balances in different Alameda subaccounts. Trial Tr. at 1404:6–8. As Nishad testified, Wang’s page reflected that “Alameda had positive balances on FTX, that it was borrowing lots in some places but that overall they had more money than they [ECF p. 29] didn’t.” Id. Nishad took further comfort that the negative $2.7 billion figure in Alameda’s main account would have been “a front-and-center number in all of Alameda’s trading systems. It’s the sort of thing from [Nishad’s] time at Alameda [he] couldn’t imagine being missed or ignored by anyone there.” Id at 1367:21–24. In addition, far from expressing concern, when the result of the exercise was the discovery of a bug that had erroneously overstated Alameda’s liability as $19 billion instead of the correct $11 billion figure, Nishad recalls “sensing from [the] others a palpable sense of relief and even celebration.” Id. at 1530:7–8. The majority of the liability consisted of FTX customer fiat that was supposed to be housed in Alameda bank accounts, and nothing about the exercise suggested to Nishad that those funds were not in the bank accounts. Ellison had even confirmed months earlier that Alameda was tracking this fiat liability. Id. at 1517:17–19, 1520:4–9. When Nishad was asked during trial “whether or not Alameda had $11 billion in its bank account” at this point in time, he stated, “I believed it did, but I didn’t know either way.” Id. at 1359:25–1360:2.

Nor did Nishad appreciate at the time that among the purposes of this project was to assess Alameda’s ability to pay back margin calls, and Nishad played no role in the decision in June 2022 to use billions of dollars in customer funds to make payments to Alameda’s lenders.

4. September 2022: Discovers Use of Customer Funds and the Hole

A little less than three months later, Nishad learned the truth about Alameda’s financial condition and the theft of customer funds. Specifically, on September 7, 2022, Bankman-Fried authored and circulated a document titled, “We came, we saw, we researched,” in which Bankman-Fried proposed shutting down Alameda because of high public relations costs due to constant questions about the proximity between Alameda and FTX. Trial Tr. at 870. Nishad proposed that rather than shut down Alameda entirely, Bankman-Fried could consider “Alameda shutting off or stopping its FTX trading,” listing in a Signal chat all of the necessary steps that he could think of that it would require, which included Alameda closing out its accounts on FTX. Id. at 870:2–4. In the chat, Ellison interjected: “That’s impossible.” Id. at 1403:10–11. This startled Nishad, so he asked Ellison “[w]hich part of” his proposal was impossible. Ellison responded, “the part about [ECF p. 30] closing out accounts.” Id. at 1403:12–16.

“At this point Gary said Alameda is borrowing 13 billion from FTX.” Trial Tr. at 1403:22–23. Nishad was “afraid” of what he heard and “was really hoping that [he] misunderstood,” and “called for a meeting immediately” with Bankman-Fried, Wang, and Ellison. Id. at 1403:24–1404:4. Bankman-Fried “seemed unsurprised and made up what [Nishad] understood to be a false excuse for dodging [the] meeting,” but the others attended. Id. at 1404:22–23, 1405:1–2. After talking to Wang and Ellison, Nishad began to understand for the first time that Alameda had made active use of billions of dollars in FTX customer funds and that it was not in a position to be able to repay it. Id. at 1405:5–8 (“Before the meeting I was really hoping that I misunderstood what had been said . . . After the meeting I was significantly less hopeful”).

Nishad was stunned. He demanded a one-on-one conversation with Bankman-Fried the same evening. Trial Tr. 1405:9–12. Such a request was uncharacteristic of Nishad. As he testified, he and Bankman-Fried “almost never met [alone]; very, very rarely,” id. at 1405:15, but that night, their conversation lasted over an hour, id. at 1406:8–10. Nishad testified in detail about this “balcony meeting” at the Orchid complex, and it featured significantly in the Government’s presentation of evidence and closing arguments, complete with photographs of the location on the balcony where the meeting took place.

Nishad opened the conversation by telling Bankman-Fried: “Caroline’s really freaked out about the NAV [net asset value] situation and so am I.” Trial Tr. at 1406:13–16 (explaining this was a “crude way of referring to the hole”). Bankman-Fried deflected at first: “I’m not sure what there is to worry about. NAV is fantastic by almost any measure. It was super positive even if you don’t include FTX and FTX.US equity.” Id. at 1406:21–1407:1. Nishad persisted, asking directly: “Well, what about what Caroline said today and Gary said today, that there’s 13 billion borrowed and we can’t pay it at all?” Id. at 1407:5–7. Bankman-Fried finally engaged: “Right, that. We are a little short on deliverable.” Id. at 1407:7–8. After Nishad learned more detail about what had been happening with customer funds, at one point, he said to Bankman-Fried, “Jesus F’ing Christ.” Id. at 1407:20–21. Bankman-Fried responded, “Yeah, this has been taxing me [ECF p. 31] some 5 to 10 percent of my productivity.” Id. at 1407:21–22. Nishad countered, “I think this is going to be doing a lot more damage to me, hitting me a lot harder.” Id. at 1407:24–25. Bankman-Fried’s immediate instinct was regret that he shared this information with Nishad: “Yeah, I was worried about this. In hindsight, it might have been a mistake for me to circulate that document this morning. People are [] going to freak out.” Id. at 1407:25–1408:3.

Nishad was one of them. After his confrontation with Bankman-Fried, Nishad “was blindsided and horrified.” Trial Tr. at 1409:5–6. He testified:

I felt really betrayed, that five years of blood, sweat, and tears from me and so many employees, driving towards something that I thought was a beautiful force for good, had turned out to be so evil. I knew that customers were betrayed. So many customers had . . . put their trust in us.

And, you know, according to Sam’s take, chances to rebuild this hole depended enormously on me continuing to try to make the company successful, and I knew that would require me betraying customers and employees.

Id. at 1409:6–11.

5. Post-September 2022: Nishad’s Conduct After Learning of the Hole

Nishad considered quitting “every day” after learning about the customer fraud scheme, but did not do so because he thought his departure would cause other employees to quit and hasten the collapse that ultimately occurred anyway. See Trial Tr. at 1409:15–20. When Nishad was asked during trial why he stayed, he explained: “How could I live with myself if my departure precipitated a fall that might have been [] avoidable.” Id. at 1409:17–20. It was a panicked, self-delusional, and ultimately criminal error in judgement. And a few weeks later, when Nishad asked for updates on the ability to repay customers, he recalls Bankman-Fried reiterating: “The main line plan remains, making FTX successful and growing it, and that depends on a huge part in you. You’re one of the few people, Nishad, that can take that kind of work off my plate so I can focus on the rest of this.” Id. at 1412:2–10.

Nishad knew that staying at FTX meant hiding the existence of the hole from customers, [ECF p. 32] and that he would be taking otherwise routine steps that, in these circumstances, would perpetuate the fraud. For example, Nishad continued to approve transactions in his “role as a member of the leadership team” as well as other spending (including campaign contributions, discussed below) in the weeks that followed, including at least one multi-million dollar acquisition spearheaded by Bankman-Fried that required Nishad to sign documents to carry out the transaction. Plea Hr’g Tr. at 29:2–11.11

11 This was the Embed acquisition by FTX US. Nishad had opposed the transaction but after Bankman-Fried insisted on proceeding with it, in October 2022 Nishad signed loan documentation related to the final $50 million of the $250 million acquisition. This expenditure was accomplished via on-paper “loans” from Alameda to Bankman-Fried, Wang, and Nishad, who – again, on paper – used those funds to acquire shares in FTX U.S., which then used the proceeds to acquire Embed. This transaction mirrored prior FTX U.S. acquisitions, structured by FTX attorneys, that Nishad had ostensibly participated in before knowing about the hole.

Most regrettably, in October 2022, Nishad closed on the purchase of a vacation home in the State of Washington for $3.7 million that was intended to be used by him and his childhood friends. Trial Tr. at 1604:6–18. He did so by using his personal FTX account to withdraw dollars against his personal token holdings. Id. at 1604:19–21. Though this was the type of withdrawal that typical customers could make, Nishad did so at a time when he was aware of the hole (although before the run on the exchange that led to the collapse). While it was plainly wrong to do so, two things bear noting: first, this was the first and only significant personal expense that Nishad made during his entire tenure at Alameda and FTX. Second, Nishad’s friend group had been pursuing a home purchase for almost an entire year, well pre-dating Nishad’s knowledge of the hole. Much earlier in 2022, the group had entered into a contract on a different home, but the seller backed out that August. Ex. A at 141 (C. Smith), 137 (P. Korolog). They then entered into a contract and sent an initial deposit on the house on September 6, 2022, Ex. A at 141 (C. Smith), which was the literal day before Nishad learned about the theft of customer funds in September 2022. Nishad proceeded to close on the house in October after learning about the hole. He should have tried to back out of his contract to purchase the home but did not. As he told the jury during trial, he is “embarrassed and ashamed” that he did not, has accepted criminal responsibility, and readily forfeited the house. Trial Tr. at 1619:21–25. Once FTX’s collapse began with the leak of [ECF p. 33] Alameda’s balance sheet to the public on November 2, Nishad did not touch any money in his personal FTX account or the bank accounts funded by his personal FTX account, which accounted for nearly all his funds, and he is forfeiting or providing to the bankruptcy estate all of his assets tied to FTX.

Even as Nishad made these plainly wrong decisions, he – perhaps naively – spent far more of his time and attention focused on filling “the hole” in customer funds or preventing making it deeper. Indeed, it was the principal reason he stayed in the first place. He told himself that he would leave if the situation did not improve, and, despite his complicity, took concrete steps to convince Bankman-Fried to cut expenditures so that Alameda would stop digging itself and FTX deeper. The government elicited testimony about these efforts during Nishad’s direct examination:

Ultimately, over just a two-month period, Nishad successfully convinced Bankman-Fried to “cut[] maybe a couple hundred million dollars of spend.” Trial Tr. at 1413:20–1414:4. However, after reviewing a spreadsheet previously unknown to him that “described outlays of future spend on endorsement deals,” Nishad became “really upset.” Id. at 1415:3–12. “There were way more [endorsement deals] than [Nishad] knew about,” and “[m]any of the numbers [were] much bigger than what [he had] been told” previously. Id. So Nishad confronted Bankman-Fried directly about them, stating: “You know, this is crazy. We need to cut as much of this as we can. I thought you [ECF p. 35] were on this.” Id. Bankman-Fried responded these were not “bad” expenditures and then “challenged” Nishad “to point to one that was worth cutting,” which Nishad did. Id. at 1414:13–21. The spreadsheet and interaction revealed “much more” that Nishad felt “was either cuttable or [should] at least [be] strongly curtailed” and “that Sam simply wasn’t cutting.” Id.

In addition to cutting expenditures after learning about the fraud scheme in September 2022, Nishad took tangible steps to protect customers and shield funds where he could:

In other words, upon learning of the fraud in September, Nishad did not stay at FTX out of self-interest or to try to save Bankman-Fried, Ellison, or Wang. Nishad appreciated the wrongfulness of the scheme at the time he learned about it. He understood that by staying, he was complicit in it, and he continued to approve expenses that necessarily dug the hole deeper. For these reasons, to be clear, Nishad’s conduct in these final two months was criminal. But the greater context of [ECF p. 36] Nishad’s decision to stay while being complicit is relevant.