[1349:1] Q. Just briefly starting on sheet 1, what is this sheet?
[1349:2] A. This is the sheet that -- that Caroline sent that shows Alameda systems' understanding of their balances in all of these FTX accounts.
[1349:5] Q. Let me just take a background question of what we are looking at here.
[1349:7] What kind of document or file is this?
[1349:8] A. I recall this being a Google Doc.
[1349:9] Q. What kind of document do you recognize is on the screen?
[1349:10] A. Do you mind rephrasing that?
[1349:11] Q. I'm wondering what was the format in which you received this information?
[1349:13] A. I received it in Google Docs form, Google Sheets.
[1349:14] Q. What's Google Sheets?
[1349:15] A. It's a cloud-based version of Microsoft Excel.
[1349:16] Q. Did it resemble what we are looking at here?
[1349:17] A. Yeah, very closely. Had all the same contents.
[1349:18] Q. So what was this first sheet, sheet 1?
[1349:19] A. This is the sheet that I first saw when Caroline sent us the document, so presumably the one that Caroline wrote.
[1349:21] MR. ROOS: Let's now look at sheet 2.
[1349:22] Q. What's this sheet?
[1349:23] A. This is the sheet that Gary made with his attempt at the technical exercise that I described.
[1349:25] Q. Let me ask you a few questions about what we are seeing [1350:1] here.
[1350:2] The first column, A, says, in the first row, ID, and then there are a bunch of numbers below it.
[1350:4] What does that column refer to?
[1350:5] A. These are the IDs of those accounts in the FTX database.
[1350:6] Q. What do you mean, the IDs of accounts in the FTX database?
[1350:7] A. Many objects in FTX's database had numbers associated with them and uniquely identified them. Those are called IDs colloquially. These are those identifying numbers for the accounts table.
[1350:11] Q. What's listed in column B on the spreadsheet?
[1350:12] A. The user name of those accounts. This is another column in the accounts table.
[1350:14] Q. What's listed in column C?
[1350:15] A. I didn't generate this, but I generated my version of it and I know what Gary told me to generate there. So inferring that he did the same thing or assuming he did, this is the dollar value of the holdings in each of those accounts.
[1350:19] Q. So let me ask you about a few of the accounts here. You testified that the defendant said that the initial balance that Caroline Ellison calculated was wrong. Was it?
[1350:22] A. Yes.
[1350:23] Q. Why was that balance figure wrong?
[1350:24] A. There were many reasons it was wrong. The one that had the biggest effect, I believe, is that fiat@FTX.com, which [1351:1] represented the total amount that was in bank accounts to be custodied of customer fiat, that calculation, the system that had been updating that number had a bug such that the obligation that Alameda had was overstated by nearly $8 billion.
[1351:6] Q. Let's break down your answer.
[1351:7] Starting with the basics, what do you mean when you say fiat deposits?
[1351:9] A. FTX supported customers sending traditional currencies. That's what I meant by fiat, things like dollars, euros, GBP.
[1351:11] Q. How were those fiat deposits recorded at FTX?
[1351:12] A. In a number of ways. One of these systems involved in tracking them interacted with fiat@FTX.com's balances in that a deposit sent to a bank account was credited to a customer on the FTX system by, in effect, transferring from them in the sort of a technical system from the fiat@FTX.com account.
[1351:17] Q. What kind of account is the fiat@FTX.com account?
[1351:18] A. It's a special account. It's not one that customers would log into. It's an accounting-oriented account.
[1351:20] Q. What does the total in the fiat@FTX.com account represent?
[1351:21] A. Absent bugs, it is supposed to represent negative the amount that has been net deposited of fiat in the FTX system by customers.
[1351:24] Q. What do you mean negative the net amount that's been deposited?
[1352:1] A. If the balance here was negative $10, then that should represent that customers have on net, after all deposits and withdrawals, deposited $10 into bank accounts.
[1352:4] THE COURT: I'm sorry. Into what bank accounts?
[1352:5] THE WITNESS: Bank accounts that customers were directed to send to by FTX to be credited on the FTX system, managed either by Alameda or FTX at different times.
[1352:8] THE COURT: And so is it correct that that was money which, at least in a sense, Alameda was borrowing from or owed to FTX?
[1352:11] THE WITNESS: It certainly owed it to FTX.
[1352:12] THE COURT: Proceed.
[1352:13] MR. ROOS: Thank you.
[1352:14] Q. What does the term fiat liability refer to?
[1352:15] A. It refers to the magnitude of this number, the amount that Alameda needs to have custodied on behalf of FTX customers in banks.
[1352:18] Q. What's the relationship between the number and the fiat@FTX.com account and what's supposed to be in the bank accounts?
[1352:21] A. It is always larger than what should be in bank accounts, but it's very close. The reason it's larger is because for some time deposits had been going into FTX bank accounts, not Alameda ones. Through that point is that the fiat@FTX.com number would have represented exactly what should be in Alameda [1353:1] bank accounts.
[1353:2] Q. We will come back to what you just said in a moment.
[1353:3] You mentioned earlier in your testimony a bug. Can you describe what you are referring to.
[1353:5] A. Yes. Sometime in 2021, Adam Yedidia was working on the fiat system and automating the elements of it. In doing so, he accidentally introduced a bug that prevented the correct accounting for fiat@FTX.com's balances on specific types of withdrawals.
[1353:10] As a result, over time there was an error that grew in the balance stored for fiat@FTX.com such that, by June, it was -- the stated number is negative 19 billion but the correct number would have been negative 11.
[1353:14] THE COURT: That's June of which year, please?
[1353:15] THE WITNESS: 2022.
[1353:16] THE COURT: Thank you.
[1353:17] Q. Approximately when in June 2022?
[1353:18] A. Mid June 2022.
[1353:19] Q. Just a few more background questions on this topic.
[1353:20] Prior to your discussion of balances in June 2022, had you learned whether or not Alameda was accepting FTX customer deposits?
[1353:23] A. Yes.
[1353:24] Q. When did you know of that?
[1353:25] A. Very, very early in FTX's existence. One of the first [1354:1] things that FTX did before going live was connecting it to OTC.FTX.com, which was a reskin of another OTC system that Gary and Sam had built. That system supported depositing fiat into Alameda's bank accounts. That system could be used to onboard funds via fiat deposits to FTX once they were linked.
[1354:6] Q. What, if any, conversations did you have with the defendant about Alameda receiving FTX customer deposits prior to June 2022?
[1354:9] A. We had discussions on improving this set up technically that I helped sort of direct Adam to pursue. I'd also heard from him and from others that the reason that Alameda bank accounts were used at all in the beginning was because FTX had a hard time securing bank accounts but Alameda already had them.
[1354:15] Q. Who was the him in the answer you just gave?
[1354:16] A. Sam.
[1354:17] Q. Prior to June 2022, had you ever spoken to the defendant about the fiat@FTX account?
[1354:19] A. Yes.
[1354:20] Q. What did he say to you?
[1354:21] A. He understood that it was something that Alameda --
[1354:22] MR. COHEN: Can we have a time frame, please.
[1354:23] THE COURT: Prior to June of 2022.
[1354:24] MR. COHEN: More than that.
[1354:25] THE COURT: Pardon?
[1355:1] MR. COHEN: Is there anything more than that?
[1355:2] THE COURT: You can inquire.
[1355:3] MR. COHEN: OK. Thank you, your Honor.
[1355:4] THE COURT: Proceed.
[1355:5] A. Early, maybe December 2019, I remember discussions about the setup of fiat@FTX.com. I think I overheard them. This was an audit discussion I was participating in myself in which there was talk about how fiat@FTX.com would be incorporated into Alameda's own native sense of what their balances were, such that customer deposits made into bank accounts, plus their consideration of fiat@FTX.com, should always be zero.
[1355:12] Q. Who do you recall participating in that conversation you overheard?
[1355:14] A. Sam Bankman-Fried, Jen Chan, and I believe at least one trader or Alameda engineer, but I don't remember who.
[1355:16] Q. What was Jen Chan's role?
[1355:17] A. Chief of staff of FTX.
[1355:18] THE COURT: Could I just ask go back a minute.
[1355:19] You were asked whether prior to your discussions of balances in June '22 you had learned whether or not Alameda was accepting FTX customer deposits, and you said yes.
[1355:22] Then you were asked: When did you know that? You said: Very, very early in FTX's existence. One of the first things FTX did before going live was connecting it to OTC.FTX.com, which was a reskin of another OTC system that Gary [1356:1] and Sam had built. That system supported depositing fiat into Alameda's bank accounts. So that system could be used to onboard funds via fiat deposits to FTX once they were linked.
[1356:4] Now, can you explain that answer.
[1356:5] THE WITNESS: I can talk about it mechanically, what a customer would do and how the funds --
[1356:7] THE COURT: What we are trying to find out is what you knew about Alameda taking or not taking FTX customer deposits very early in FTX's existence. Could you pick it up from there.
[1356:11] THE WITNESS: Me?
[1356:12] THE COURT: Yes. That's to you. That's a fair question.
[1356:14] THE WITNESS: I knew that FTX customers could deposit funds to Alameda bank accounts in order to be credited with those funds on FTX to trade from FTX's inception and that one of the ways they could do it is by depositing to Alameda bank accounts through the separate system called OTC.FTX.com and then transferring those to FTX.com.
[1356:20] THE COURT: Was there another way?
[1356:21] THE WITNESS: In December of 2019, an analogous system was set up, but directly on FTX. So customers could, on FTX, view wire instructions that they should send their funds to, and those wire instructions were for Alameda bank accounts.
[1356:25] THE COURT: Then how were those deposits reflected and [1357:1] where?
[1357:2] THE WITNESS: Those deposits were sent to Alameda bank accounts, and then the technical FTX system through use of -- through somebody observing the deposits into bank accounts, somebody would go and manually credit on the FTX system the corresponding user with the amount that they had sent to the bank account, and in that process what would happen under the hood is that fiat@FTX.com would go negative via the amount deposited and the customer's account would go positive via the amount deposited.
[1357:11] The net effect is, a customer sent $10 to an Alameda bank account. Somebody working for Alameda or FTX on the FTX system presses a button that credits the user on FTX with 10 virtual dollars and decrements fiat@FTX's.com balance by $10.
[1357:15] THE COURT: Which other FTX.com balance?
[1357:16] THE WITNESS: Fiat@FTX.com's balance.
[1357:17] THE COURT: That's the way it was supposed to work, right?
[1357:19] THE WITNESS: Right.
[1357:20] THE COURT: What was the bug?
[1357:21] THE WITNESS: The bug, which I think was introduced sometime in 2021, was that when a withdrawal was processed in a specific programmatic way, the customer's balance was successfully decremented, the funds were successfully sent through actual bank accounts, but fiat@FTX.com's like virtual [1358:1] balance was not successfully incremented.
[1358:2] THE COURT: So the apparent liability, from the point where the bug was introduced, owed by Alameda to FTX grew and grew. Is that right?
[1358:5] THE WITNESS: Yes.
[1358:6] THE COURT: And part of that balance was there because it belonged there and part of it was the result of the bookkeeping error by virtue of the failure to reflect the withdrawal from the customer account in the fiat@FTX account, yes?
[1358:11] THE WITNESS: That's exactly right.
[1358:12] THE COURT: Let's go on.
[1358:13] MR. ROOS: Thank you.
[1358:14] Q. And who identified that error or bug?
[1358:15] A. I am not sure who first identified it, but, in late 2021, I overheard a conversation between Gary and Adam Yedidia or Gary was explaining it to Adam.
[1358:18] Q. Take a look at lines 13 and 14 of the spreadsheet.
[1358:19] What does this reflect?
[1358:20] A. Line 13 reflects what was literally in the fiat@FTX.com's like virtual balance. Line 14 is something that Gary added as a correction for the effect size of the bug until this point.
[1358:23] Q. Judge Kaplan asked you about the fiat@FTX account balance being overstated. Where, if anywhere on the spreadsheet, does it reflect that number?
[1359:1] A. Negative 19 billion is an overstatement by the number in cell C14.
[1359:3] Q. Where, if anywhere, is the correction to that overstatement?
[1359:5] A. In row 14, C14.
[1359:6] Q. With those two pieces of information, are you able to determine the correct fiat@FTX.com balance as of this date?
[1359:8] A. This correctly determines the total amount of customer deposits sent to FTX or Alameda bank accounts. There is one additional step that needs to be taken to find out how much had been sent to Alameda versus FTX bank accounts.
[1359:12] Q. Just sticking on this for a moment, how can you determine what the correct balance in fiat@FTX.com is?
[1359:14] A. Summing these two numbers.
[1359:15] Q. So summing those two numbers, what was the correct balance in fiat@FTX.com at the time?
[1359:17] A. About negative $11 billion.
[1359:18] Q. So what does a negative $11 billion reflect?
[1359:19] A. It reflects that in banks, Alameda's or FTX, there should be $11 billion of fiat sent by customers.
[1359:21] Q. Now, at the time of the conversation you had in June 2022 about the fiat bug, what, if any, involvement did you have in Alameda's banking?
[1359:24] A. None.
[1359:25] Q. At this point did you know whether or not Alameda had $11 [1360:1] billion in its bank account?
[1360:2] A. I believed it did, but I didn't know either way.
[1360:3] Q. What was your understanding as to whether Alameda was allowed to use or spend the FTX customer fiat deposits it had received?
[1360:6] A. I didn't have an affirmative understanding, but using it would break common-sense expectations from customers.
[1360:8] MR. COHEN: Objection.
[1360:9] THE COURT: Sustained.
[1360:10] MR. ROOS: Judge, can we have a moment on this one?
[1360:11] THE COURT: Ask another question.
[1360:12] MR. ROOS: I'll come back to that, actually.
[1360:13] Q. Now, do you see below this, in row 17, an account called info@AlamedaResearch?
[1360:15] A. Yes.
[1360:16] Q. What is the balance at the time of info@AlamedaResearch?
[1360:17] A. Negative $2.78 billion.
[1360:18] Q. Do you recognize that account?
[1360:19] A. Yes. This is the main Alameda trading account.
[1360:20] Q. How was it possible for Alameda to have a balance in its main account of negative $2.7 billion?
[1360:22] A. Alameda had a flag granted to them, a feature called allow negative, which by this point allowed them to be negative via withdrawing or transferring or trading arbitrary amounts, unlimited amounts.
[1361:1] Q. What was the flag called?
[1361:2] A. Allow negative.
[1361:3] Q. And what, if any, role did you have in the creation of allow negative?
[1361:5] THE COURT: Let's just find out what he's talking about when we are talking about a flag. I don't imagine it's Don't Tread on Me.
[1361:8] THE WITNESS: It's a property of this account stored in the database. Flag means that it can either be true or false, and in this case this allow negative property for this account was true.
[1361:12] Q. So it's like a feature?
[1361:13] A. It's a feature.
[1361:14] THE COURT: It's a feature of the program, right?
[1361:15] THE WITNESS: Yes.
[1361:16] THE COURT: The same kind of feature that when you try to write a check on my bank account for a million dollars, the bank won't pay it, right? I haven't got a million dollars.
[1361:19] THE WITNESS: Same type of thing.
[1361:20] Q. If you have the feature turned on that allows negative, what does that allow?
[1361:22] A. It allows you to withdraw more than your balance such that you can have a negative balance in the end without bound.
[1361:24] Q. What, if any, involvement did you have in creating that feature?
[1362:1] A. I wrote the first version of allow negative, which had meaningfully different abilities.
[1362:3] Q. Before I ask you about the abilities, when you say you wrote it, what do you mean? What are you referring to?
[1362:5] A. Under Gary's and Sam's advisement and direction, I wrote the computer code that added this allow negative feature to the code base.
[1362:8] Q. What computer code?
[1362:9] A. The python future code used as part of the FTX system.
[1362:10] Q. What do you mean by code base?
[1362:11] A. FTX had a lot of code that it used to sort of run its technical systems. Code base is a term that encapsulates all of that code.
[1362:14] Q. I want to be clear about something. Judge Kaplan asked you a question about where the flag was and your testimony was in the database. You just testified about the code. Are those the same things or different?
[1362:18] A. They are different.
[1362:19] Q. What's the difference?
[1362:20] A. The code defines how the system functions, depending on whether or not an account has the flag. The database shows and stores if an account has a flag.
[1362:23] Q. Where does this allow negative feature show up for Alameda?
[1362:24] A. It shows up as turned on for them in the database.
[1362:25] Q. Now, what did the allow negative feature allow Alameda to [1363:1] do initially?
[1363:2] A. Initially, it allowed them to go negative up until they hit their collateral limit, but they can go negative in any currency until that point.
[1363:5] Q. You mentioned it changed. What, if any, changes are you aware of?
[1363:7] A. There were changes later in 2020, such that it could then go negative without any balance, so not bounded by its collateral limit, and there was a change added such that it would never be liquidated.
[1363:11] Q. Let me ask you about each of those things. Starting with the last one, what do you mean by, it would never be liquidated?
[1363:14] A. Should I describe liquidation first?
[1363:15] Q. Sounds good.
[1363:16] A. Liquidation is the process of closing out an account that otherwise might end up under water. If an account is put on a bet that could lose by more than the account has collateral in it, it's the exchange's job to sort of close out that bet before that trade has lost more money than the customer initially deposited. It's a safeguard for the exchange and for other customers that, when executed well, prevents accounts from ever going negative, thereby dipping into other customers' assets.
[1363:25] Q. And you testified that Alameda's account was exempt from [1364:1] that liquidation. What does that mean?
[1364:2] A. That Alameda could be in a position where it was liable to lose a lot of money and hurt other customers, or not just liable but well beyond that fact, had lost a lot of money or borrowed a lot of money such that it was taken from other customers without the system then taking any actions to close out their account or prevent that.
[1364:8] Q. What were the other -- you listed them. But what were the other features that allowed negative -- maybe I'm using the word features too many times. What else did allow negative permit an account to do besides avoiding liquidation and going negative?
[1364:13] A. It allowed many means of arriving at a negative balance, such as withdrawing money that it didn't have, so any withdrawing such that it was very negative, transferring to others such that it was negative, trading such that it was negative.
[1364:18] Q. What do you mean trading such that it was negative?
[1364:19] A. Selling a Bitcoin when Alameda's balance was zero Bitcoins, so they would have negative 1 at the end of it.
[1364:21] Q. When Alameda had a negative balance in its account and was withdrawing money, where did that money come from?
[1364:23] A. Other customers.
[1364:24] Q. Why?
[1364:25] A. There is only a few sources of funds that comprise what's [1365:1] in FTX's wallets. There is FTX's revenue. Then there is customer assets less Alameda and there is Alameda assets. If Alameda's like stated ownership of an amount is zero and then they go and withdraw it, it must necessarily be coming from one of the other parts or both. For non-USD tokens, if FTX only made revenue in USD-like tokens, then it was necessarily coming from other FTX customers.
[1365:8] Q. I have to ask, what is a USD token?
[1365:9] A. There are some tokens, like USDC, TUSD, that are stablecoins that are pegged to the dollar, and that in the crypto space are sometimes treated interchangeably with dollars.
[1365:13] Q. What's a stablecoin?
[1365:14] A. A coin that holds its value at $1, one U.S. dollar.
[1365:15] Q. It's a form of cryptocurrency?
[1365:16] A. Right.
[1365:17] Q. When you participated in the creation of the allow-negative feature, what did you understand its purpose to be?
[1365:19] A. I was told it was for two purposes. It was for unifying a set of existing functionalities for accounts like Alameda accounts to go negative and for giving FTX staff the ability and a page to transfer locked forms of FTT to customers or to pay expenses.
[1365:24] Q. When was it that you were told those were the purposes?
[1365:25] A. The day of or -- as I was writing the code, so the day of [1366:1] or the day before, when I was instructed to write the code.
[1366:2] Q. I'm looking for a date or a year. When was that?
[1366:3] A. July 2019.
[1366:4] Q. You said someone told you this. Who told you this?
[1366:5] A. Sam gave me the project of making a page to allow transferring forms of FTT such that balances of the account that the transfer was coming from could end up negative. Gary suggested the specific implementation in details, including adding the allowed negative flag and sort of all the minutia of what that meant in the code.
[1366:11] Q. Taking us back to June 2022 and the spreadsheet, what was your reaction when you saw Alameda had a negative $2.7 billion balance in its main account?
[1366:14] A. It seriously concerned me. This seemed like a real abuse of a feature that until this point I believed was serving FTX, not hurting it.
[1366:17] Q. As far as you knew, what was your understanding as to what customers had agreed to?
[1366:19] MR. COHEN: Objection.
[1366:20] THE COURT: Sustained.
[1366:21] Q. What was your understanding as to whether using customer funds was appropriate?
[1366:23] A. It was inappropriate.
[1366:24] Q. Why?
[1366:25] A. Does not meet the default expectations a customer would [1367:1] have, and I don't recall --
[1367:2] MR. COHEN: Objection.
[1367:3] MR. ROOS: Relevant to his mental state.
[1367:4] THE COURT: Sustained. Excuse me. Overruled.
[1367:5] THE WITNESS: Should I continue?
[1367:6] THE COURT: Continue.
[1367:7] A. Yes. And I don't ever recall it being stated to customers that their funds were being taken, and I remember affirmative descriptions from Sam and others that Alameda didn't have special treatment, and this would constitute a form of special treatment.
[1367:12] Q. What led you to conclude that the negative 2.7 was, to use your word, abuse and not an allowed use of allow negative?
[1367:14] A. The allowed usage or the acceptable uses in my mind resulted -- were ones such that accounts would be negative for incidental reasons and in small amounts and then be shortly after -- would be topped off shortly after.
[1367:18] This is not a small amount. It does not strike me as incidental. I expected that this had been there for a while if it was this negative. And it sort of couldn't have been a mistake. This number, Alameda's main accounts balance, is a front-and-center number in all of Alameda's trading systems. It's the sort of thing from my time at Alameda I couldn't imagine being missed or ignored by anyone there.
[1367:25] Q. Let's take a look at column I and J. What's reflected in [1368:1] that column?
[1368:2] A. There is a total that includes -- it is probably the result of a sum of column C, maybe absent a few lines.
[1368:4] Q. If you just look at the top here, I am going to circle it, seeing that, do you know what the total refers to?
[1368:6] A. If there isn't something in D indicating to exclude a given row, then the sum is the corresponding value in column C.
[1368:8] MR. ROOS: Can we just scroll down and so the witness can see whether there is something in D.
[1368:10] Let's go back up.
[1368:11] Q. What does the total in column J refer to?
[1368:12] A. It looks like it's just the sum, all the things that we see in column C.
[1368:14] Q. What's in column C?
[1368:15] A. USD values of the holdings in each of those accounts.
[1368:16] Q. Now, in response to one of Judge Kaplan's questions you mentioned that there was a change in terms of which accounts were receiving money.
[1368:19] Do you remember that answer?
[1368:20] A. Yes.
[1368:21] Q. What was the change in the bank accounts receiving money?
[1368:22] A. Over the course of 2021 and early 2022, FTX started acquiring bank accounts and customer deposits and withdrawals are processed out of those, not the Alameda ones.
[1368:25] MR. ROOS: We can take the spreadsheet down, by the [1369:1] way.
[1369:2] Q. After FTX got bank accounts in its name, what did the balance in that fiat@FTX account reflect?
[1369:4] A. It reflected the total amounts that should have been in Alameda and FTX bank accounts on behalf of customers.
[1369:6] Q. So to be clear, was Alameda responsible for the entirety of that fiat liability?
[1369:8] A. No.
[1369:9] Q. What part?
[1369:10] A. They were responsible for the amounts that had been sent to Alameda bank accounts, and then the rest FTX was responsible for.
[1369:13] Q. How, if at all, did FTX or Alameda address the combined number in the fiat@ account?
[1369:15] A. Sorry. I am not sure what you mean. Do you mind rephrasing.
[1369:17] Q. You mentioned that Alameda was not responsible for the entirety of the fiat@ balance?
[1369:19] A. Right.
[1369:20] Q. What, if anything, was done to address the fact that Alameda was not responsible for the entire amount?
[1369:22] A. Adam, Andrea, and Gary went through an exercise with help of the fiat settlement team to determine what the right split was and then separate the liabilities, so they were recorded in separate areas.
[1370:1] Q. What do you mean by the right split?
[1370:2] A. Determine how much had been sent to Alameda bank accounts, how much had been sent to FTX bank accounts, confirm that there is some lined up with what was stated for fiat@FTX.com, and then split that fiat@FTX.com balance into two balances: One corresponding to what Alameda owed, one corresponding to what FTX owed.
[1370:8] Q. You used the word exercise. Do you mean like a project?
[1370:9] A. Yes.
[1370:10] Q. When was that project to split the fiat liability?
[1370:11] A. Sometime in the weeks or months after this June exercise where we discovered this bug.
[1370:13] Q. Who took the lead on determining what Alameda owed?
[1370:14] A. I'm not confident. I believe -- I know that Adam ended up writing and executing a lot of the code. I know that Gary was very involved in it.
[1370:17] Q. What's your understanding of what Adam Yedidia or others did to figure out the balance split?
[1370:19] A. I don't have an understanding affirmatively.
[1370:20] MR. COHEN: Objection.
[1370:21] THE COURT: If you don't have one, let's stop there.
[1370:22] Q. Just to be clear, did you work on this project directly?
[1370:23] A. No.
[1370:24] Q. Now, what, if anything, did you learn about the results of this project?
[1371:1] A. That it had happened, that there was in fact a split made, that fiat@FTX.com after the split represented the amounts that were in FTX bank accounts or that FTX was responsible for, and that there was a new subaccount created called FTX fiat old under the info@Alameda Research account that reflected how much Alameda was responsible for or should be in Alameda's banks.
[1371:7] Q. Let's break your answer down there.
[1371:8] First, it wasn't clear to me. Do you know how much of the fiat@FTX.com liability Alameda was responsible for?