Trial Testimony of Nishad Singh, October 16 and 17, 2023: Transcript, part 5 of 13 (pages 1395 to 1417)

[1395:8] A. This is——this matches my recollection of what the line of credit was for, for Alameda's account.

[1395:10] Q. And what's the next largest below it?

[1395:11] A. 150 million given to Genesis Capital.

[1395:12] Q. Now does this spreadsheet anywhere show Alameda's balances on FTX?

[1395:14] A. So I don't——I didn't see this spreadsheet while I was at FTX and I don't know how all the values were computed, but——

[1395:16] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1395:17] THE COURT: The document speaks for itself, counsel.

[1395:18] Q. Do you see this net number?

[1395:19] A. Yes.

[1395:20] Q. Okay. What's the net number?

[1395:21] A. It's the sum of——

[1395:22] MR. COHEN: Same objection.

[1395:23] THE COURT: Sustained.

[1395:24] MR. ROOS: Can I just have him read the number into the record. That's actually all I was going for.

[1396:1] THE COURT: You've got it highlighted, and the jury is looking at it there.

[1396:3] MR. ROOS: Okay. Thank you, your Honor.

[1396:4] BY MR. ROOS:

[1396:5] Q. Picking up on something you said a moment ago, this document that lists that 65 billion number and this negative 5 billion number, did you see this while you were at Alameda?

[1396:8] A. No, nor while at FTX that I recall.

[1396:9] Q. Okay. And do you recognize the writing style on it?

[1396:10] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1396:11] A. Yes.

[1396:12] THE COURT: Sustained.

[1396:13] Q. Are you familiar——do you have any familiarity with the defendant's writing style?

[1396:15] A. A lot of familiarity.

[1396:16] Q. How?

[1396:17] A. I've seen his writing and writing process many times over our five years working together.

[1396:19] Q. Did you ever see him write any spreadsheets?

[1396:20] A. All the time.

[1396:21] Q. Are you familiar with his writing style on spreadsheets?

[1396:22] A. Yes.

[1396:23] Q. Do you recognize anything about the writing style in this spreadsheet?

[1396:25] A. I do.

[1397:1] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1397:2] MR. ROOS: 901(b)(4) and (b)(5).

[1397:3] THE COURT: Did you say (d) or (b)?

[1397:4] MR. ROOS: (b) as in boy, (4) and (5).

[1397:5] THE COURT: Thank you.

[1397:6] I think you need a better foundation than you have.

[1397:7] BY MR. ROOS:

[1397:8] Q. Were there any——you testified a moment ago that you reviewed spreadsheets written by the defendant. Were there any distinctive characteristics about how he wrote spreadsheets?

[1397:11] A. There were.

[1397:12] Q. What were they?

[1397:13] A. They were rarely ever color coded; they frequently exhibited some sort of casualness about naming and structure; they rarely had capital letters; they usually, my recollection, often had data on the left and summaries of that data on the right, as opposed to like further down.

[1397:18] Q. How about how, if at all, accounts were referred to in them?

[1397:20] A. If——if they were like pulled from a data source, they might include like the full description of the account or login. Else they would refer——you'd often have shorthand that——that Sam used.

[1397:24] Q. And do you see in column L the four email addresses?

[1397:25] A. Yes.

[1398:1] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1398:2] THE COURT: Overruled.

[1398:3] Q. Do you recognize those email addresses?

[1398:4] A. I do.

[1398:5] Q. And who did they belong to?

[1398:6] A. The first belongs to Sam.

[1398:7] THE COURT: No, no, no, no, no. You're just reading from the document now.

[1398:9] MR. ROOS: I'm just asking him whose email addresses does he recognize.

[1398:11] THE COURT: Fair enough. Okay. Go ahead.

[1398:12] A. The first belongs to Sam, the second to Caroline, the third to Gary, the fourth to me. To clarify, when I say belongs, my——mine and possibly Sam's and Gary's weren't like beneficially owned by us. They were admin accounts to be used on the system.

[1398:17] Q. Now do you recognize the writing style in the document?

[1398:18] A. I do.

[1398:19] Q. Whose writing style do you recognize?

[1398:20] A. Sam's.

[1398:21] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1398:22] THE COURT: Members of the jury, it's ultimately up to you to decide whether this document was written by the person who the witness is going to identify. There's enough here so that I've concluded you're entitled to make that judgment one [1399:1] way or the other.

[1399:2] Okay. Overruled.

[1399:3] A. Forgive me. This isn't a question that you asked, but another distinctive characteristic——

[1399:5] Q. No. I think there was a pending question. There was an objection, I think your Honor overruled, so I think you have to answer the question.

[1399:8] MR. ROOS: Is that right, your Honor?

[1399:9] THE COURT: Yes. And I think he answered before, or at least before the reporter got Mr. Cohen's objection. Whether that was temporally right or not, I don't know, but he answered.

[1399:13] MR. ROOS: Okay. My apologies. I didn't see it.

[1399:14] BY MR. ROOS:

[1399:15] Q. Now you said that you did not see this spreadsheet at the time. Did there come a time when you later learned some of the information?

[1399:18] A. Yes.

[1399:19] Q. So let's move forward.

[1399:20] MR. ROOS: We can take this down.

[1399:21] Q. Do you recall ever participating in a conversation about shutting down Alameda?

[1399:23] A. Yes.

[1399:24] Q. And what led to that conversation?

[1399:25] A. Sam sent a Google Doc over Signal to me and Gary titled "We [1400:1] came, we saw, we researched." It laid out a case for shutting down Alameda, citing that Sam didn't have faith in its——the competency of its leadership without him more involved, and that the PR cost with both FTX and Alameda coexisting was high.

[1400:5] Q. What type of document was this, just to be clear?

[1400:6] A. A Google Doc.

[1400:7] Q. Did it have a title?

[1400:8] A. "We came, we saw, we researched."

[1400:9] Q. Did you read the Google Doc about shutting down Alameda?

[1400:10] A. I read most but not all of it.

[1400:11] Q. After reading the document what, if any, proposals did you make with respect to Alameda?

[1400:13] A. It occurred to me that the cost, the cost that Sam cited was Alameda and FTX coexisting; really the cost is Alameda existing on FTX, and so I proposed shutting down Alameda on FTX as opposed to shutting down Alameda entirely.

[1400:17] Q. What would be required to shut down Alameda on FTX?

[1400:18] A. I remember I listed out what I believed the requirements would be in the chat. We'd have to close a bunch of illiquid markets that Alameda was primarily market making on. They were not a significant market maker overall, but there were some markets where nobody else bothered to trade. We'd have to revamp how the OTC system worked——over-the-counter trading. Alameda was sort of plugged in as the only provider for those trades, but that could have been——that could have been, you [1401:1] know, given to a pool of market makers. We'd have to have Alameda close out all of its accounts, return everything that it was negative in, like that main account that was negative 2.8 billion, withdraw everything that it was positive in. Maybe a few other things. But those are some big ones.

[1401:6] Q. So let me ask you a few questions about closing out Alameda on FTX.

[1401:8] For starters, by this time, September 2022, to what extent was Alameda's presence on FTX necessary for market making?

[1401:11] A. Not very.

[1401:12] Q. What do you mean by that?

[1401:13] A. There was a time when Alameda was in some 20, 30 percent of trades. By 2022, or at least by a point in 2022, Alameda was only a party to like some 2 percent of trades or thereabouts. Alameda was not nearly as significant a player as it used to be on the platform. The ways in which it was involved that still provided value to the exchange were replaceable for——or not so important that it was necessary.

[1401:20] Q. And by 2022, did Alameda need the "Allow Negative" feature to do market making?

[1401:22] A. I don't know all the details of how it did its market making, and it's possible that it like availed of "Allow Negative" in some way, but fundamentally, no, I don't think that to perform the duties that were more important of it, it [1402:1] needed all the things that "Allow Negative" granted.

[1402:2] Q. By 2022, was Alameda needed for stablecoin conversion?

[1402:3] A. They were never needed for it. My belief is that they were doing it out of convenience in the beginning. Certainly once FTX had grown, it had enough staff, those staff could just manage the stablecoin creations and redemptions.

[1402:7] Q. You mentioned that Alameda would need to close out its accounts. What did you mean by that?

[1402:9] A. Alameda had many accounts on FTX. Like we'd seen with that other spreadsheet, some of them were big positive numbers, some of them big negative numbers. Each of those has underlying numbers for, you know, balances of specific coins. Closing out means making every one of those numbers zero, by depositing any amounts that are negative and withdrawing any amounts that are positive.

[1402:16] Q. So after you proposed shutting down Alameda on FTX, what, if anything, did the defendant say?

[1402:18] A. I first proposed it inside the chat with myself, Gary, and him, and asked if I could share it with Caroline to talk about its viability. Sam said "not crazy." His way of——

[1402:21] THE COURT: He said what?

[1402:22] THE WITNESS: "Not crazy." He used "not crazy" to greenlight a proposal without fully endorsing it.

[1402:24] Q. Did you ask Caroline Ellison about the viability of shutting down Alameda trading on FTX?

[1403:1] A. I did. I sent a message inside the hashtag organization Signal group, which had me, Gary, Caroline, and Sam. I said: The PR costs of having Alameda on FTX seem really steep. I'm thinking about if it's possible to have Alameda shut down on FTX. Here are some six things I think that would take.

[1403:6] Q. You mentioned PR costs. What were you referring to?

[1403:7] A. Public relations cost, that there was a lot of worry and fear in the crypto ecosystem about conflicts of interest between Alameda and FTX.

[1403:10] Q. So how did Caroline Ellison respond to your message?

[1403:11] A. She said——and I believe verbatim——"That's impossible."

[1403:12] Q. How did you respond to that?

[1403:13] A. I said: Which part of it? I was pretty alarmed. And I was hoping it wasn't the part about closing out accounts.

[1403:15] Q. What did she say?

[1403:16] A. That it was the part about closing out accounts.

[1403:17] Q. Just to be clear, who was on this hashtag organization Signal chat?

[1403:19] A. Me, Gary, Sam, Caroline.

[1403:20] Q. What, if anything, did Gary Wang say in the conversation at this point?

[1403:22] A. At this point Gary said Alameda is borrowing 13 billion from FTX.

[1403:24] Q. What did you say in response to that?

[1403:25] A. I was really hoping that I misunderstood, and I called for [1404:1] a meeting immediately.

[1404:2] Q. What was your reaction about hearing Alameda owed $13 billion?

[1404:4] A. I was really afraid.

[1404:5] Q. What do you mean?

[1404:6] A. The June exercise, I thought Alameda had positive balances on FTX, that it was borrowing lots in some places but that overall they had more money than they didn't. This suggested an entirely different reality. I was hoping that I didn't really understand what Gary meant by borrowing, but if I did, this was absolutely devastating.

[1404:12] Q. And how, if at all, did Alameda's borrowing $13 billion from FTX affect FTX customer funds?

[1404:14] A. The borrowing had to have been from customer funds in large part because FTX itself didn't have——like, didn't own that much money.

[1404:17] Q. How, if at all, did the defendant react when Caroline Ellison said Alameda has——I'm sorry——when Gary Wang said Alameda was borrowing 13 billion from FTX?

[1404:20] A. I was sitting next to Sam at the time. We were in the office. So I got some real sense. He seemed unsurprised and made up what I understood to be a false excuse for dodging the meeting.

[1404:24] Q. So you mentioned the meeting. Did you in fact meet?

[1404:25] A. Yes.

[1405:1] Q. Okay. And then who did you meet with?

[1405:2] A. Just Gary and Caroline because Sam didn't come.

[1405:3] Q. What was your belief at this point as to whether Alameda could repay the $13 billion it owed?

[1405:5] A. Before the meeting I was really hoping that I misunderstood what had been said and that Alameda could in fact close out and repay what it owned. After the meeting I was significantly less hopeful.

[1405:9] Q. Now did there come a time when you spoke to the defendant about this topic?

[1405:11] A. That evening.

[1405:12] Q. And where did you speak with the defendant?

[1405:13] A. On the balcony of the Orchid 6 penthouse where we lived.

[1405:14] Q. Why did you meet on the balcony?

[1405:15] A. Sam and I almost never met; very, very rarely. I knew this needed to be really private. I figured that if we went to our two most common spaces to talk, which were my room or in the office, that both of those were very frequently used by other people for meetings and that others could stumble in on us, and I knew that there was something really serious going on and I didn't want people stumbling in.

[1405:22] Q. What time of day was this?

[1405:23] A. Evening into night.

[1405:24] MR. ROOS: Could we please publish Government Exhibit 1554, which is in evidence.

[1406:1] Q. Mr. Singh, what's this?

[1406:2] A. This is the balcony that we met on.

[1406:3] Q. Where were you located on this balcony when you spoke with the defendant?

[1406:5] A. I was pacing behind where these baskets on the left are. Sam was reclined on one of the white like chaise chairs behind that.

[1406:8] Q. How long was your conversation with the defendant on the balcony?

[1406:10] A. Hour, hour and a half.

[1406:11] Q. Let me ask you a few questions about the conversation.

[1406:12] First, how did the conversation begin?

[1406:13] A. I said: Caroline's really freaked out about the NAV situation and so am I. NAV, by the way, means net asset value, which was——I wasn't very fluent in financial terms. This was my crude way of referring to the hole.

[1406:17] Q. What do you mean by the hole?

[1406:18] A. The fact that Caroline had suggested that Alameda couldn't return its borrows, that meant that there was, in my lingo, a hole, a deficit of customer funds.

[1406:21] Q. What, if anything, did the defendant say in response to your initial comment that you and Caroline Ellison were freaking out?

[1406:24] A. He said: I'm not sure what there is to worry about. NAV is fantastic by almost any measure. It was super positive even [1407:1] if you don't include FTX and FTX.US equity.

[1407:2] Q. Did you speak to the defendant directly about the hole?

[1407:3] A. Yes.

[1407:4] Q. And what did you discuss?

[1407:5] A. I said next: Well, what about what Caroline said today and Gary said today, that there's 13 billion borrowed and we can't pay it all? Sam said: Right, that. We are a little short on deliverable.

[1407:9] Q. What do you mean by deliverable?

[1407:10] A. Assets that can be delivered to customers as opposed to illiquid assets.

[1407:12] Q. Did he say by how much FTX was short on deliverable assets?

[1407:13] A. I asked: How much is it short by? Sam said: That is the wrong question to be asking. The right question is how much can we deliver, and in 24 hours, if pressed, I think we could deliver around $5 billion; given some more weeks, substantially more; given some more weeks after that, substantially more.

[1407:18] Q. Now what, if anything, did the defendant say about how this had been affecting him over the prior year?

[1407:20] A. He did describe it. I said something like "Jesus F'ing Christ." Sam said: Yeah, this has been taxing me some 5 to 10 percent of my productivity for——and he either said for this year or like for this calendar year or since before the last year. I said: I think this is going to be doing a lot more damage to me, hitting me a lot harder. Sam said: Yeah, I was [1408:1] worried about this. In hindsight, it might have been a mistake for me to circulate that document this morning. People are thus going to freak out. I said: I understand it's not productive to respond emotionally.

[1408:5] Q. What, if anything, did you discuss about a plan for addressing Alameda's negative balance?

[1408:7] A. I asked what the hell the plan was, what are we going to do. Sam said he's not too worried and he described a number of sort of strategies that we could pursue in parallel going forward.

[1408:11] Q. What kind of strategies did he describe?

[1408:12] A. He described selling off Alameda's illiquid but, according to his estimation, valuable assets, and properties; he described, for the ones that weren't sellable but generated revenue, making sort of low-hanging changes to make them more profitable; he discussed raising from investors, selling FTX equity; and he discussed making FTX——oh, he said that FTX.US futures, which we believed would come online, you know, any day now, would be a boon to the company, and would be great for revenue and for its valuation, and that there were many engineering projects that were crucial and were themselves very valuable.

[1408:23] Q. Did you have any discussions about expenses?

[1408:24] A. Yes.

[1408:25] Q. What did you discuss?

[1409:1] A. I asked if now, Sam would take seriously cutting expenses or——and curbing them going forward. He said yes, definitely, he's working with that——working on that with Ramnik.

[1409:4] MR. ROOS: We can take this down.

[1409:5] Q. After this conversation, what was your mental state?

[1409:6] A. I was blindsided and horrified. I felt really betrayed, that five years of blood, sweat, and tears from me and so many employees, driving towards something that I thought was a beautiful force for good, had turned out to be so evil. I knew that customers were betrayed. So many customers had to put their trust in us. And, you know, according to Sam's take, chances to rebuild this hole depended enormously on me continuing to try to make the company successful, and I knew that would require me betraying customers and employees.

[1409:15] Q. Did you consider leaving the company?

[1409:16] A. Every day.

[1409:17] Q. Why didn't you?

[1409:18] A. How could I live with myself if my departure precipitated a fall that might have been unavoidable——or might have been avoidable.

[1409:21] Q. After your conversation with the defendant on the balcony, what steps, if any, did the defendant take with respect to raising money for the company?

[1409:24] A. He followed through on the plan that he discussed in that——

[1409:25] MR. COHEN: Objection, foundation.

[1410:1] THE COURT: Sustained.

[1410:2] Q. You testified that the defendant said he had plans for raising money; is that right?

[1410:4] A. In that conversation on the balcony, Sam——I had asked to get more details on prospects and plans regarding raising money from investors. Sam had mentioned that he was planning to go to New York in two weeks with Ramnik, and in a month, from the conversation, he was planning on going to the Middle East with Ramnik and Scaramucci.

[1410:10] Q. Who is Scaramucci?

[1410:11] A. I think Anthony is his first name. He was the press secretary or chief of staff for Trump for some time and runs a VC firm, I think.

[1410:14] Q. And after your conversation on the balcony, what, if anything, did you observe about whether these trips took place?

[1410:16] A. They took place.

[1410:17] Q. Now did there come a time when the defendant returned from the Middle East?

[1410:19] A. Yes.

[1410:20] Q. What, if anything, did the defendant say to employees at FTX about how the trip went?

[1410:22] A. Sam arrived back from the Middle East in the middle of the day on a weekday, came into the office, and attracted a crowd, like he often does. Sam was regaling everybody with stories of the Middle East and how successful it was and talking about how [1411:1] it's turning a corner and being more progressive culturally and so on.

[1411:3] Q. Did you speak to the defendant after his return from the Middle East?

[1411:5] A. Yes.

[1411:6] Q. In what setting?

[1411:7] A. I asked him if we could meet again privately. Again, this was an exceedingly rare thing. I did this like less than once a year on average. But I wanted to know what the real deal was with prospects for the raise.

[1411:11] Q. And did you meet privately?

[1411:12] A. We did, in his apartment in Gemini 1D.

[1411:13] Q. Okay. Can you describe the conversation in the apartment.

[1411:14] A. I started by saying: I'm really not doing well, I thought I might quit, in that conversation. I kind of wanted to put him on notice. I asked: How is it going with NAV? What's the plan? Any updates? I was standing in the living room area, right behind the counter to his kitchen. He was in the kitchen with his back up against the fridge. He described for me in some real detail what the Middle East trip was like and what prospects were from raising——for raising from various investors there.

[1411:23] Q. Did he say how much money he thought could be raised?

[1411:24] A. He said that we can make——it's still possible that nothing comes out of this deal, that $0 could be raised, but that we [1412:1] could also come out of this with another $5 billion.

[1412:2] Q. So 5 billion is not 13 billion. What, if anything, did you discuss about the difference?

[1412:4] A. I said: I'm really happy to hear we can pull up that much, but, like, oh, my god, we have a lot left. What's the plan? Like, tell me you've got some updates. Sam said: The main line plan remains, making FTX successful and growing it, and that depends on a huge part in you. You're one of the few people, Nishad, that can take that kind of work off my plate so I can focus on the rest of this.

[1412:11] Q. What was the tone of this conversation?

[1412:12] A. I was really afraid to ask for a conversation, and I think my fears kind of bore out. Sam was on edge, and I felt he was very mad at me for talking about this, and it was tense. There were long periods of silence. Sam has a——some physical twitches for when he gets angry.

[1412:17] MR. COHEN: Objection.

[1412:18] THE COURT: Strike the last sentence.

[1412:19] MR. ROOS: Your Honor, I think it's relevant to the tenor of the conversation.

[1412:21] THE COURT: It's unresponsive to the question.

[1412:22] MR. ROOS: Yes, your Honor.

[1412:23] BY MR. ROOS:

[1412:24] Q. What was the defendant's body language in the conversation?

[1412:25] MR. COHEN: Same objection.

[1413:1] THE COURT: Overruled.

[1413:2] A. Sam has some physical tells for when he is thinking hard or is upset, and a lot of those were on display.

[1413:4] Q. What are you referring to?

[1413:5] A. Puffed out his chest, had his hand back, hands back, he was grinding his finger, closing his eyes, grinding his teeth or tongue in his mouth, and when he opened them to respond, he would sort of glare at me with some intensity. This didn't happen for the whole conversation, but it did happen at specific points, like when I asked, like, Dear god, what else is there? Give me some updates. I ended up apologizing to him at the end for asking for the meeting because I could tell it was so unwelcome.

[1413:14] Q. Now you testified about cutting expenses. Withdrawn.

[1413:15] You testified about, during the conversation you had on the balcony, a portion of the conversation about cutting expenses. I want to ask you some follow-up questions about expenses in the fall of 2022, okay?

[1413:19] A. Okay.

[1413:20] Q. All right. So how, if at all, did spending change in September onwards?

[1413:22] A. In some ways I was pleasantly surprised. I really pushed for a number of large items to be cut, and I think I was successful in cutting maybe a couple hundred million dollars of spend. But there was also a point——there were a couple of [1414:1] points when I felt like our real obligation to be doing so was not being taken seriously and that it was much, much more that was either cuttable or at least strongly curtailed, that Sam simply wasn't cutting.

[1414:5] Q. Now after the conversation with the defendant about the $13 billion hole, what, if any spending did you speak to him about specifically?

[1414:8] A. I spoke to him about various endorsement deals, spoke to him about reversing the AZA acquisition, spoke to him about reversing the Embed acquisition, spoke to him about canceling the kind of disgusting FTX office plans——it was going to be a big F——that cost——at first I heard 50 million, eventually 250 million.

[1414:14] Q. Let me ask you about what things you just said.

[1414:15] You said AZA. What's that?

[1414:16] A. I forgot what it stands for, but it's a payments company that FTX had——was some part of the way through acquiring, but I believe was still a reversible transaction.

[1414:19] Q. And what's Embed?

[1414:20] A. Embed is a company that FTX.US acquired at Brett Harrison's behest to list FTX.US stocks.

[1414:22] Q. In September of 2022, did you have any disagreements with the defendant about spending?

[1414:24] A. Yeah.

[1414:25] Q. What topics did you disagree with him on?

[1415:1] A. You said in September?

[1415:2] Q. September 2022 onwards.

[1415:3] A. In one instance, I saw that spreadsheet we looked at earlier that Jayesh showed me that had outlays——that described outlays of future spend on endorsement deals. I was really upset about that. There were way more than I knew about. Many of the numbers are much bigger than what I'd been told. And there was like a billion dollars headed out the door. If FTX was making a billion dollars a year, this puts us like a year of revenue behind with a hole. And so I approached Sam and said: You know, this is crazy. We need to cut as much of this as we can. I thought you were on this.

[1415:13] Q. And what, if anything, did he say?

[1415:14] A. He said he didn't think that these were bad spends, and he sort of like challenged me to point to one that was worth cutting. I did point to a couple. And for the ones I pointed at, he agreed that they were bad, but he said that those weren't his fault and that everybody proposing cutting them was shortsighted because the cost associated with cutting them was about like 70 percent of the cost of seeing them through and so it wasn't worth it.

[1415:22] Q. Was there any other spending that you had disagreements about in September 2022 to November 2022?

[1415:24] A. There are the others I mentioned, AZA and Embed.

[1415:25] Q. What about any——what, if any, proposed transactions did you [1416:1] have disagreements about?

[1416:2] A. There was a point when Sam was in the Middle East, he sent a message to a Signal group called hashtag meetings, or hashtag groups, which contained a lot of folks in leadership——maybe some eight or ten of them——basically pitching that FTX do a deal with Telegram.

[1416:7] Q. And what happened in response to that proposal?

[1416:8] A. Yeah, Sam described that FTX could build a payment-processing service for Telegram and that Telegram would give us a lot of TON, which was their coin, some hundreds of millions of dollars' worth. Seemed like a huge win, wasn't a big lift to build this payment service, probably, and we get a lot of money for it. Ramnik clarified that we'd also pay $120 million for it.

[1416:15] Q. How did you respond to that?

[1416:16] A. Made me extremely nervous. Getting even longer random illiquid tokens was not something I was excited about, especially when the cost would come from customers.

[1416:19] Q. What do you mean by that?

[1416:20] A. Spending dollars, spending anything, after September was necessarily digging the customer deficit hole deeper.

[1416:22] Q. Why do you say that's the case?

[1416:23] A. FTX was short on funds to give to customers. Alameda owed that back. If either FTX or Alameda was spending liquid funds to acquire more illiquid stuff that was not for customers, that [1417:1] was necessarily spending customer funds, not for customer benefit.

[1417:3] Q. When you responded to this potential Telegram deal, how did the defendant respond, if at all?